Two US federal appeals courts recently held that a provision of the Bankruptcy Code can protect private company sellers in the event that the company they sold later goes bankrupt and a fraudulent transfer claim is brought against them to recover the sale proceeds. The courts found that this protection applies when a financial institution is used to handle the transfer of consideration in the sale.

In U.S. v. Apex Oil, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit ruled 3-0 that EPA’s cleanup injunction against the corporate successor to a chemical company was not discharged in Chapter 11 because the injunction does not create a right to payment and, consequently, is not a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code.

In a decision with potentially broad implications, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently determined that payments made to former shareholders of a privately held company in a leveraged buyout transaction are protected as "settlement payments" pursuant to section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.

The Bottom Line:

The FDIC has recently appealed a loss it suffered at trial on the question of whether the debtor in bankruptcy (the holding company of a failed bank) made a “commitment” to maintain the capital of its subsidiary bank under Section 365(o) of the Bankruptcy Code.  After a week-long bench trial with an advisory jury, the Northern District of Ohio rejected the FDIC’s claim that a commitment had been made by the holding company to the Office of Thrift Supervision.  The F

In connection with the administration of the debtors’ bankruptcy case, the trustee in Badovick v. Greenspan (In re Greenspan), No. 10-8019, 2011 Bank. LEXIS 272 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Feb.

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC, ruled Bankruptcy Code section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, i.e. just a “mere restriction on the effects of a valid exercise” of judicial power “when a party successfully appeals a covered authorization.” Before MOAC, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, but the Fifth and Second Circuits had diverged.

Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit addressed on Monday a circuit split concerning appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy court orders rejecting planned confirmation in In re William Lindsey.   In an opinion by Judge Sutton, the Sixth Circuit joined four other circuits which had concluded that a decision rejecting a confirmation plan does not constitute a final appealable order under Section 158(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Court noted that an unpublished decision in t