On 8 October 2013, the Supreme Court of Vietnam released the most recent draft of the new Law on Bankruptcy ("Draft Bankruptcy Law"). The Draft Bankruptcy Law is now open for comments and, once passed by the National Assembly, will replace the current Law on Bankruptcy 2004 ("Current Bankruptcy Law").

The Draft Bankruptcy Law appears generally to be a positive step in Vietnam's efforts to improve the efficiency of the bankruptcy process and efforts to enhance the credibility of the legal framework for restructuring.

Conduct of Bankruptcy Proceedings

In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, F.3d 736 (3rd Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit broke from other courts by holding that S corporation status (or "qualified subchapter S subsidiary" or "QSub" status) is not property of the estate of the S corporation's bankruptcy estate. Other Circuits have routinely held that entity tax status is property of the estate.

Fiduciaries who breach their duties may pay the consequences far longer than they may think, for they may not even be able to escape liability through personal bankruptcy.  In Raso v. Fahey (In re Fahey), No. 11-1118 (June 11, 2013), the U.S Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts became the first court to apply the new defalcation guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Bullock v. BankChampaign, NA, 133 S. Ct.

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently resolved a split within the circuit when it held that a bankruptcy court has the power to recharacterize debt as equity.

Chapter 11 debtors and sophisticated creditor and/or shareholder constituencies are increasingly using postpetition plan support agreements (sometimes referred to as “lockup” agreements) to set forth prenegotiated terms of a chapter 11 plan prior to the filing of a disclosure statement and a plan with the bankruptcy court. Under such lockup agreements, if the debtor ultimately proposes a chapter 11 plan that includes prenegotiated terms, signatories are typically obligated to vote in favor of the plan.

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of a cramdown (nonconsensual) chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

The Ninth Circuit held on April 30, 2013 that a bankruptcy court “has the authority to determine whether a transaction creates a debt or an equity interest for purposes of [Bankruptcy Code] § 548, and that a transaction creates a debt if it creates a ‘right to payment’ under state law.” In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc., 2013 WL 1800000, *1 (9th Cir. April 30, 2013). The court agreed with five other circuits, but explicitly followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s recent In re Lothian Oil, Inc. decision. 650 F.3d 539, 543-44 (5th Cir.

Applying Minnesota law, a federal district court has held that, where an entity’s principal shareholder was insolvent, but the entity was not, the individual’s insolvency could not be attributed to the entity for purposes of establishing Side A coverage for “Non-Indemnifiable Loss.” Zayed v. Arch Ins. Co., 2013 WL 1183952 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2013). The court further held that allegations of fraudulent inducement did not trigger an exclusion for claims “arising from” contractual liability, but that the claim was uninsurable as matter of law.

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).