2006 FICA Refund Claims Due April 15, 2010

The FDIC has adopted final rules which provide that the FDIC, as receiver of a covered financial company, may recover from senior executives and directors who were substantially responsible for the failed condition of the company any compensation they received during the two-year period preceding the date on which the FDIC was appointed as receiver, or for an unlimited period in the case of fraud.

Changes made to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 raised the bar considerably for providing “pay to stay” incentives that had been offered routinely to management and other key employees of a chapter 11 debtor, such as a severance or key employee retention plan (“KERP”).

In the first circuit-level opinion on the issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of establishing priority under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, an employee's severance pay was "earned" entirely upon termination of employment, even though the severance amount was determined by the employee's length of service with the employer.

Section 507(a)(4)

In a case illustrating the effective use of a bankruptcy examiner, the examiner appointed by the court in the North General Hospital bankruptcy case has concluded that the hospital made over $3 million in unauthorized post-bankruptcy filing payments to the detriment of unsecured creditors. Prior to its bankruptcy filing, North General Hospital and certain related corporate debtors operated a hospital in the Harlem section of Manhattan.

The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) purported to eliminate the ability of chapter 11 debtors in possession to pay bonuses to management through Key Employee Retention Plans. However, in recognition of the fact that a real need often exists to incentivize key employees to remain with a reorganizing or liquidating business, bankruptcy courts have approved incentive plans providing for payments to insiders and other employees. Such plans must be carefully crafted to avoid the restrictions on retention bonuses post-BAPCPA.

The recent downturn in the financial sector and related bankruptcy filings have shed light on issues involving executive compensation, particularly in chapter 11 cases. Specifically, bankrupt companies often have paid substantial bonuses to executives prior to filing for bankruptcy protection and desire to retain those executives throughout the bankruptcy process through additional bonus payments and similar schemes. These types of payments have been criticized as giveaways to management.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.

Debtors, creditors, purchasers and lenders continue to carefully monitor employee incentive programs after the 2005 changes to Bankruptcy Code brought on by BAPCA. Although many feared the changes to section 503(c) would eliminate an important tool for creating incentives for employees, courts have consistently approved reasonable and well-thought-out incentive programs.

Factual Background

In an important recent decision, United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., et al.,1 in which Pepper represented the prevailing party, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (SUB payments) paid by a bankrupt company to its former employees were not wages subject to taxation under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).