A terminated officer of a corporate debtor, who bargained for “18 months of severance ( … $375,000 … ) to ensure that his firing not disrupt [the debtor’s] negotiations for $80 million” of financing gave the debtor “reasonably equivalent value,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Oct. 15, 2015. In re Adam Aircraft Industries, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17930, at *27 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2015).

Debtors, creditors, purchasers and lenders continue to carefully monitor employee incentive programs after the 2005 changes to Bankruptcy Code brought on by BAPCA. Although many feared the changes to section 503(c) would eliminate an important tool for creating incentives for employees, courts have consistently approved reasonable and well-thought-out incentive programs.

Factual Background

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.

The recent downturn in the financial sector and related bankruptcy filings have shed light on issues involving executive compensation, particularly in chapter 11 cases. Specifically, bankrupt companies often have paid substantial bonuses to executives prior to filing for bankruptcy protection and desire to retain those executives throughout the bankruptcy process through additional bonus payments and similar schemes. These types of payments have been criticized as giveaways to management.

No doubt by now, every creditor knows of the new protections given to employees in the face of a company’s insolvency as a result of the enactment of the Wage Earner Protection Program Act (“WEPPA”) and related amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) on July 7, 2008.

The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) purported to eliminate the ability of chapter 11 debtors in possession to pay bonuses to management through Key Employee Retention Plans. However, in recognition of the fact that a real need often exists to incentivize key employees to remain with a reorganizing or liquidating business, bankruptcy courts have approved incentive plans providing for payments to insiders and other employees. Such plans must be carefully crafted to avoid the restrictions on retention bonuses post-BAPCPA.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has issued a decision concluding that company-paid medical coverage offered as part of an employee severance package is a “retiree benefit” that cannot be unilaterally modified by the company in bankruptcy, except as provided under Section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code.

On February 10th, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed, in one opinion, two separate appeals arising from a company's Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the outset, the Court held that a severance payment to the firm's former CEO was a fraudulent transfer. The former CEO was an insider, since he was still CEO when the severance agreement was signed, even though he was not employed when he received the actual payment. The Court held further that the company did not receive equivalent value for the severance payment.

A recent decision provides new support for excluding a broad range of severance pay from FICA taxes—a position undercut by the taxpayer’s loss in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). United States v. Quality Stores Inc., (W.D. Mich., Feb. 23, 2010), affirms a bankruptcy court’s conclusion that, contrary to Revenue Ruling 90-72, 1990-2 C.B.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 10, 2010, that a corporate debtor’s pre-bankruptcy severance payments to its former chief executive officer (“CEO”) were fraudulent transfers. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., ____ F.3d _____, 2010 BL 28145 (5th Cir. 2/10/10). Because of its holding “that the payments were fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code,” the court did “not consider other possible violations, including [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] or [Bankruptcy Code] Section 547(b) [preferences].” Id. at *5.