(7th Cir. July 28, 2016)
(7th Cir. July 27, 2016)
The Seventh Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s order finding that the debtor’s prepetition transfer of a farm to the defendant was a fraudulent transfer subject to avoidance. The debtor transferred the farm in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to abandon litigation he had brought against the debtor. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the farm. Opinion below.
Per Curiam
Defendant: Pro Se
Attorney for Trustee: Brenda L. Zeddun
(7th Cir. July 26, 2016)
The Seventh Circuit interprets a Wisconsin exemption statute applicable to annuity contracts. The statute provides that such a contract is exempt from assets available to creditors so long as it “complies with the provisions of the internal revenue code.” The trustee argued for a narrow interpretation of this language, while the Court ultimately agrees with the broader interpretation of the statute employed by Wisconsin bankruptcy courts. Opinion below.
Judge: Hamilton
Attorney for Debtors: Dewitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Craig E. Stevenson
This is the first of three follow-up blogs to our earlier publication Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: General Overview. This blog explores ABC’s lack of statutory automatic stay and whether there is a functional and practical equivalent. The next blog will discuss whether a creditor may file a claim after the statutory 120-day deadline.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Unsecured Creditors Committee of Sparrer Sausage Co., Inc. v. Jason’s Foods, Inc., 2016 WL 3213090 (7th Cir. June 10, 2016) expanded the scope of the ordinary course defense in a bankruptcy preference action. This case provides an excellent road map for a creditors’ rights attorney defending a preference suit and suggests arguments for increasing the payments a creditor can retain even if those payments were made during the 90-day preference period.
When an adversary proceeding is transferred to the district court pursuant to a withdrawal of the reference, which rules—and deadlines—apply: those contained within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or those contained within the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure? The Eleventh Circuit recently held the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, govern adversary proceedings before the district courts. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 2016 WL 1392642 (11th Cir. 2016).
Until the recent U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 194 L.Ed.2d 655, 84 U.S. L.W. 4270 (2016), there was disagreement in the circuit courts regarding whether a debtor in bankruptcy could be denied a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) where the evidence of wrongdoing proved the debtor committed actual fraud, but there was no evidence that the debtor made a misrepresentation to the creditor seeking to bar the discharge.
The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to compel return of a payment made to a creditor within 90 days before a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). The justification for compelling the return of preference payments is to level the playing field among creditors by not rewarding those who, perhaps, pressed the debtor the hardest on the eve of bankruptcy.
(7th Cir. June 23, 2016)
The Seventh Circuit reverses the bankruptcy court, concluding that the bankruptcy code permits modification of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan based on increased income post-confirmation. While the code does not expressly permit modification on this basis, other courts have permitted this. The trustee had filed a motion to increase the debtors’ plan payments based on an alleged $50,000 post-confirmation increase in the debtors’ annual income. Opinion below.
Judge: Adelman
Attorney for Debtor: Eugene Wedoff
It is relatively rare when a Circuit Court issues an opinion on the preference defenses under section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is even more unusual when a decision examines the fact-focused “ordinary course” defense under section 547(c)(2). The ordinary course defense shields payments determined to have been made in the “ordinary course of business” of both the debtor and the creditor.