On July 26, 2016, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) "safe harbor" applicable to constructive fraudulent transfers that are settlement payments made in connection with securities contracts does not protect "transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions (or the other entities named in section 546(e)), where the entity is neither the debtor nor the transferee but only the conduit."FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 2016 BL 243677.

Filing a proof of claim with a bankruptcy court representing a debt subject to an expired state law limitations period does not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) under an opinion released yesterday from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Under the ruling, in Owens v. LVNV, the Seventh Circuit joins the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s holding under Crawford v. LVNV that such proofs of claim violate the FDCPA.

The Seventh Circuit dismisses the appeal, holding that the bankruptcy court’s final order implementing the district court’s order directing turnover of assets to the bankruptcy estate was valid, because it resolved a core proceeding. The appellants contended that it was a non-core proceeding and thus required a district court order to be final. Opinion below.

Judge: Posner

Attorney for Appellants: Jordan Law P.C., Terrence M Jordan

Last week, the Seventh Circuit chimed in on whether time barred proofs of claim violate the FDCPA.In Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the Seventh Circuit affirmed three district court decisions which dismissed consumer’s FDCPA claims against debt buyers who filed time barred proofs of claim.Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, Nos. 15-2044, 15-2082, 15-2109 (7^th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016).In doing so, the Seventh Circuit joins the Second and Eighth Circuits in siding against the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).

In the November/December 2014 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we discussed a decision handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware addressing the meaning of “unreasonably small capital” in the context of constructively fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation. In Whyte ex rel. SemGroup Litig. Trust v.

The U.S. Supreme Court has handed down two rulings thus far in 2016 (October 2015 Term) involving issues of bankruptcy law. In the first, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 194 L. Ed. 2d 655, 2016 BL 154812 (2016), the Court addressed the scope of section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which bars the discharge of any debt of an individual debtor for money, property, services, or credit to the extent obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition."

Section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code prohibits a bankruptcy trustee from avoiding “settlement payment[s]”, or payments “made in connection with a securities contract,” that are “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” qualifying financial entities, including financial institutions, stockbrokers, commodities brokers and others.

In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,¹ the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.

We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)

(7th Cir. July 28, 2016)