On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in In Re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir., June 28, 2011). In the closely watched case, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), holding instead that secured lenders have the right to credit bid in “free and clear” asset sales where their liens are being stripped, whether those sales occur under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or under a chapter 11 plan.
In its recent opinion in Jerome Listecki, as Trustee of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee Catholic Cemetery Perpetual Care Trust v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 2015 WL 1010089 (7th Cir.
The Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge those debts arising from willful and malicious injuries caused by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Because debtors have a habit of filing bankruptcy soon after a judgment for such an injury is entered against them, bankruptcy courts often give a prior (state or federal) judgment issue-preclusive effect when the creditor seeks to have the debt declared non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).
In a little-noticed November opinion, the Seventh Circuit greatly expanded the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a security interest for documentation errors under section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. See State Bank of Toulon v. Covey (In re Duckworth), 776 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2014).
In re Bronk (Cirilli v. Bronk), No. 13-1123 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2015), resolved a couple of “questions of first impression,” slip op.
As we explained in a post yesterday, the Seventh Circuit in In re Bronk (Cirilli v.
On November 21, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a very tough opinion for lenders. In this case, a borrower signed a $1,100,000.00 Promissory Note dated December 15 and an Agricultural Security Agreement dated December 13. The Security Agreement said that it granted the bank a security interest in crops and farm equipment. The Promissory Note referred to the Security Agreement. Unfortunately, the Security Agreement stated that it secured a Promissory Note dated December 13, not December 15.
A debtor’s prepetition causes of action and other legal interests typically become property of the debtor’s estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. In a chapter 11 case, this often leaves the trustee (or debtor in possession) with the sole authority to pursue – or not pursue – such causes of action postpetition. Although the trustee is generally required to maximize the value of the estate, situations can arise where a trustee refuses to pursue litigation that is otherwise in the estate’s best interest.
Vigilantibus non dormientibus, æquitas subvenit.
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