Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.
The recent ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana in the Chapter 11 case of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC 1 (“Yellowstone”), which found that a senior secured lender had engaged in “overreaching and predatory lending practices”, suggests an application of lender liability theory from today’s perspective to a transaction that took place before the credit crisis.
The recent financial crisis has resulted in events that once seemed impossible. Recently, in the federal government’s attempts to bail out the auto industry, an event unprecedented in American history almost occurred: the forced subordination of existing secured debt to new loans issued by the federal government. If the government were to revive this concept in future bailouts and attempt to subordinate the liens of secured creditors, a suit challenging the constitutionality of such action would have a good chance of success.
The Potential For Forced Subordination
In a recent case,1 the Fifth Circuit emphasized its rule that a creditor's claim may be equitably subordinated to the claims of other creditors only to the extent necessary to offset the harm that the other creditors have suffered, based on specific findings and conclusions.
Background
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.
The Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization may be confirmed over the opposition of a class of secured creditors whose secured claims are not being paid in full only if it provides one of the following1--
Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.
The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.
Virtually all public indentures contain provisions allowing the issuer to cure ambiguities and make other technical changes to the debt documentation without debtholder consent. When the purported ambiguities have substantive consequences, however, issuers may not be able to get away with an amendment that lacks debtholder approval. InGSO Coastline Credit Partners L.P. v. Global A&T Electronics Ltd. (NY App. Div. 1st Dept. May 3, 2016), a New York lower court bought into a “cure of ambiguity” argument and on that basis granted a motion to dismiss.
The Bottom Line: