On 5 October 2022 a judgment was handed down by the Supreme Court in the case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA (Sequana) and others.This judgment relates to an insolvency dispute between BTI, the assignee of AWA’s claims, and Sequana. Principally, it concerns which entity should make the payment for an outstanding liability incurred by AWA, arising out of the National Cash Register Company’s (NCR) pollution of the Fox River in Wisconsin. Through a series of restructurings, AWA became liable to indemnify British American Tobacco (BAT) for these costs.

Following a long wait of 18 months, the Supreme Court has today confirmed that the appeal of the decision in BTI –v- Sequana is unanimously dismissed.

The key question that many of us have been waiting for the answer to is: Does the creditor duty set out in s172(3) of the Companies Act 2006 exist and if so, when is it engaged?

Federal district courts, with the consent of the parties, are authorized by statute to refer "civil matter[s]" to magistrate judges for the purpose of conducting all proceedings and entering a judgment in the litigation. In the case of an appeal to a district court from a bankruptcy court, however, this statutory authority arguably conflicts with another statutory provision dictating that appeals from a bankruptcy court order or judgment be heard by a "district court" or a "bankruptcy appellate panel." This apparent conflict was recently addressed by the U.S.

Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (June 6, 2022)

In Short

The Situation: Bankruptcy courts have split on what rate of post-petition interest unimpaired creditors of a solvent debtor are entitled to receive. Bankruptcy courts have variously ruled that such creditors were entitled to the contractual rate of interest, interest at the federal judgment rate (about the rate on a one-year Treasury bill) as of the bankruptcy petition date, or an equitable rate. Another possibility is that no interest is payable at all.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions provide comfort to financial institutions that transfers made under protected financial contracts will generally not be subject to avoidance or “clawback” if the transferor subsequently files for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently ruled in the Puerto Rico bankruptcy case that Fifth Amendment takings claims cannot be discharged or impaired by a bankruptcy plan. As a matter of first impression in that circuit, the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and held that former property owners affected by prepetition takings must be paid in full.

In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., 41 F.4th 29 (1st Cir. 2022)

The Supreme Court rules in a recent decision over different bankruptcy incidents. The first relates to a work contract to supply materials in which a penalty clause for late work is established, and the ability to execute the works under the guarantee provided in the contract if the contractor may not execute them. Having a delay in delivery of the work and having entrusted to another company the repair works, the owner claimed the payment of the amounts and compensation with the guarantee held.

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v.

“Bad news comes in threes.” “Third time’s the charm.” “Three strikes and you’re out.”

One of these three adages may come to characterize the outcome of a case of significant import argued before the US Supreme Court this week. The Supreme Court heard arguments on Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif. The case is the third in a trilogy including Stern v. Marshall and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, which examine the scope of the constitutional exercise of judicial power by bankruptcy courts.