Following a recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation bankruptcy case approving cure notices and cure claims procedures, purchasers of unsecured trade claims originating out of executory contracts or unexpired leases should take special precautions to protect their rights or risk impairment or loss of such claims to the extent they become cure claims.

Recently, a number of high profile cases have emerged involving the application of material adverse change ("MAC") provisions, primarily in the context of leveraged buyouts.2 This week, the application of MAC clauses to a financing commitment arose in the context of the Solutia Inc. ("Solutia") bankruptcy proceeding. On February 6, 2008, Solutia filed an adversary proceeding against certain lenders (the "Lenders")3 seeking to enforce a commitment to provide $2 billion in exit financing.

Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.

We have written in the past about the risks to investors in troubled companies from trustees in bankruptcy seeking recoveries for the estate on theories such as insider trading, breaches of duty and conflicts of interest. While those risks remain real, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should provide some restraint on bankruptcy trustees.

A recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation, et al. ("Delphi") bankruptcy case calls into question the effectiveness of power of attorney provisions found in many claim purchase agreements. Specifically, on February 26, 2008, United States Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, presiding over the Delphi bankruptcy proceeding, held that claims purchasers could not submit cure notices in reliance on powers of attorney.

Delphi Sent Cure Notices Only to Contract Counterparties

Boards of directors of troubled companies must balance their fiduciary obligations to shareholders and creditors. Insolvent companies owe duties to creditors and not solely to shareholders and, under evolving case law, companies acting in the "zone of insolvency" owe a duty to creditors as well as to shareholders.

The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.

Nothing is certain in today's financial crisis - except that the legal system will be sorting out the rights and obligations of financial market participants for years to come. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

The recent steady drumbeat of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings is producing an equally persistent corollary: creditors receiving new securities issued by the reorganizing debtor or a related party in full or partial satisfaction of the creditors’ claims. Some of these creditors-cum-investors never planned to receive securities. The paradigmatic example is a creditor that enters into a normal business transaction resulting in an obligation that the debtor company hasn’t yet satisfied when it files for reorganization.

Credit agreements typically provide that any amendment permitting the release of “all or substantially all” of the collateral requires the unanimous consent of the lenders. Many market participants expect that this provision provides protection against the agent and other lenders from consenting to the sale of the collateral and releasing the corresponding liens without the consent of all lenders.