The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided landlords dealing with a rejected lease with further guidance on the size and basis of their claims against a tenant’s bankruptcy estate. Kupfer v. Salma (In re Kupfer), No. 14-16697 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2016). The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory cap – 11 U.S.C.
Editor’s Note: This is a new one for us at The Bankruptcy Cave. We are starting a series of primers, covering a narrow range of law but with more depth than just “here’s a recent case.” And also, we have our first edition of “The Bankruptcy Cave Embedded Briefs” – top quality briefs on a certain issue, feel free to download to your own form files or come back and grab ’em when you need ’em. Let us know what you think – we are always trying to improve things around here for our readers.
There are many tenants that are, shall we say, “problem children.” They pay late, open late, breach, junk up your strip or building, threaten, the works. Sometimes, the landlord finds it easier just to reach a lease termination agreement with such a tenant, with the parties walking away with a mutual release. If the lease is below market, or the landlord is really motivated to move this tenant along, the landlord even provides some “keys money” to terminate the lease.
Anyone who obtains title insurance, whether as an owner or a lender, should be aware of a recent abrupt and significant change in title insurance practices across the country. Title companies have recently stated that they will no longer delete creditors’ rights exclusions from, or add affirmative creditors’ rights coverage as an endorsement to, any of their issued title policies.
Buyers of, and lenders upon, distressed California real property can sleep a little better following a recent U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision: In the Matter of Craig L. Tippett, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18914 (September 4, 2008). In Tippett, the Court upheld the California bona fide purchaser statute against a federal preemption claim and declined to find a violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision in order to affirm an unauthorized real property sale by the Chapter 7 debtor.
The Court of Appeal has recently considered whether an LPA Receiver owes a duty of care to a bankrupt mortgagor in connection with the way the Receiver deals with the mortgaged property. In a decision which will be welcomed by Receivers and their insurers, the court decided that a Receiver owes no such duties.
The facts
In its decision on the Game Station1 appeal, the Court of Appeal has overturned the cases of Goldacre2 and Luminar3 holding that office holders of insolvent companies must pay rent of property occupied for the benefit of creditors on a “pay as you go” basis irrespective of when rent falls due under the lease.
The facts
In December’s Real Estate Update, insolvency Partner Vivien Tyrell considered a landlord’s ability to forfeit a lease where the tenant is in administration. Closely linked to this is a landlord’s ability to recover rent from a tenant which is in administration and the recent decision in Goldacre (Offices) Limited v Nortel Networks UK Limited (in administration) will be welcomed by landlords everywhere.
The case of Goldacre v Nortel, decided in December, has clarified the circumstances in which an administrator is liable to pay rent under a lease as an expense of an administration. If rent is an expense of the administration, the landlord will almost certainly be paid in full for as long as the administrator uses the property. If it is not such an expense, the landlord will be an unsecured creditor who will be lucky to receive a few pence in the pound.
In the last edition of Real Estate Update, we considered the position of a landlord wishing to keep the lease of premises to a company in administration ongoing and in what circumstances he will receive the full rent (ie 100 pence in the pound). If, however, the tenant is in administration and the landlord would like to bring the lease to an end, he would only be entitled to forfeit the lease if the administrator consents or the court grants an order giving him permission to do so.1