Pursuant to a provision of the Bankruptcy Code familiar to readers of Weil’s Bankruptcy Blog (see our prior post, To Assume or Not to Assume, that Is the Question: What Act Constitutes “Assumption” Under Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code?), the United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a bankruptcy c
While the majority of the cases covered by the Weil Bankruptcy Blog address issues arising in corporate restructurings, cases concerning individual debtors often offer interesting insights into the history and meaning of various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Michigan Court Rule 2.622 (the “Receivership Rule”) governs the appointment of receivers. The Receivership Rule was amended in 2014 to provide more explicit guidance on what courts and attorneys should consider when nominating a receiver. Specifically, the 2014 amendments addressed concerns that trial courts were disregarding qualified nominations made by the parties to the litigation in favor of judicial discretion in appointing a disinterested party to maintain the receivership estate.
As an example of the conflicting and contrasting court rulings on the effect of surrender in bankruptcy (see our prior update), the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fifth District, recently dismissed a borrower’s appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure because the borrower admitted during the course of his bankruptcy proceeding that he owed the mortgage debt and stated his intention to surrender the mortgage
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a creditor’s motion to compel the debtor to surrender mortgaged property and also denied the debtor’s motion to stay the case, holding that a chapter 7 debtor who indicates surrender of real property in his statement of intention is not obligated to surrender that property to the lienholder, whether or not the property is administered by the chapter 7 trustee.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held that a confirmable Chapter 13 plan cannot both “vest” title to real property and “surrender” that property to a secured lender, and that the secured lender may refuse to accept the vesting in satisfaction of its claim.
Thus, the Court held that a debtor may not force the transfer of title in collateral to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s claim, without the consent of the secured creditor.
Even before Congress added section 365(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it was generally understood that a nonresidential real property lease which has been validly terminated under applicable law prior to a bankruptcy filing by the debtor-former tenant cannot be assumed or assigned in bankruptcy. Moreover, the terminated leasehold interest is excluded from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and any action by the landlord to obtain possession of the formerly leased premises is not prohibited by the automatic stay.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a transfer of a tax lien to a tax buyer under Texas law does not constitute an extension of credit that is subject to the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA).
A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.
On March 11, 2016, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a distressed company’s termination of a lease pursuant to an agreement with its landlord and the relinquishment of its leasehold interest to its landlord constituted “transfers” that may be avoidable as fraudulent transfers and preferences under the Bankruptcy Code. The decision, Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. T.D. Invs. I, LLP (In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP, 816 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2016)), serves as a cautionary tale for landlords dealing with distressed tenants.
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