The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(j) did not alter or limit the lender’s right to foreclose under the terms of the valid reverse mortgage contract where the non-borrower spouse was still living in the home.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s petition for injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure sale.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently rejected an attempt by homeowners to collaterally attack a state court mortgage foreclosure judgment, affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, but on alternative grounds.

The purpose of bankruptcy is to provide for an orderly process by which a debtor’s assets can be fairly divided and distributed among creditors.

It is also meant to ensure that debtors can start fresh. Not all of a debtor’s assets are available to creditors—the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to keep certain assets safe in bankruptcy through various asset exemptions available under both state and federal law. One such exemption is Michigan’s bankruptcy-specific homestead exemption.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York recently reversed a Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of an action and held that sales arising from tax foreclosures may be avoidable as fraudulent transfers. SeeHampton v. Ontario Cty., New York, 2018 WL 3454688 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2018). The case involves two adversary proceedings commenced by homeowners against the County of Ontario (the “County”). In each matter, the County foreclosed on plaintiffs’ homes after plaintiffs failed to pay property taxes.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently dismissed a borrower’s complaint against a lender, finding that the lender did not wrongfully foreclose on the borrower or engage in predatory lending. SeeHealy v. U.S. Bank, N.A. for LSF9 Master Participation Tr., 2018 WL 3733934 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2018). In the case, the borrower executed a loan agreement secured by a mortgage on his house in 2004. In 2013, he defaulted on the loan, and the note and mortgage were assigned to the defendant lender thereafter.

As the brick and mortar retail industry continues to decline, landlords are likely to engage in an increasing number of lease disputes with delinquent tenants. As we have seen over the past five years, those disputes often end up in bankruptcy court and may drag on for months before a landlord is able to shake its non-performing tenant. But what if the landlord terminated the lease before the tenant filed for bankruptcy relief? Can the tenant revive and assume the lease? In some instances, yes.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a debtor’s claim seeking to use a bankruptcy trustee’s § 544(a) strong-arm power to avoid a mortgage on the ground that it was never perfected did not require appellate review of the state court foreclosure judgment, and therefore was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a mortgagee’s foreclosure action did not violate an automatic stay imposed during one of the plaintiff’s chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules, where the debtor failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules to disclose his recent acquisition of the subject property from his son.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the mortgagee because father and son plaintiffs were judicially estopped from claiming a stay violation.

In the era that preceded the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and its enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy estates often lost the value of leases and other contracts that could have been realized for creditors by use or sale as a result of termination provisions (either discretionary or ipso facto), limitations or outright prohibitions on assignment, and counterparty self-help.[1] The Code sou

A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision provides insight into “bad faith” claims-buying activity; specifically whether a creditor’s purchase of claims for the express purpose of blocking plan confirmation is permissible. In In re Fagerdala USA-Lompoc, Inc., the Court found it was—the secured creditor did not act in bad faith when it purchased a subset of all general unsecured claims and voted those claims against confirmation because it was acting to further its own economic interest as a creditor, without some extrinsic ulterior motive.