The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a mortgagee’s failure to take a deficiency judgment against a borrower who filed bankruptcy in a concluded state foreclosure action precluded the mortgagee from making a deficiency claim in the borrower’s bankruptcy proceeding.
A copy of the opinion in BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Anderson is available at: Link to Opinion.
The retail sky is falling. At least that is how it appears from recent and unprecedented number of retailers filing for bankruptcy. From iconic stores such as Sears and Toys ‘R’ Us, to department stores such as Bon Ton, to mall stores including Brookstone, The Rockport Company, Nine West, among others. The reasons given for such filings vary as much as their products but one theme seems to be constant — the inability of retailers to maintain “brick and mortar” operating expenses in the era of online shopping.
On February 14, 2019, Judge Lane of the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY issued an opinion in Republic Airways Holdings Inc. addressing whether the liquidated damages provisions in certain aircraft “true leases” under Article 2A of the New York UCC were enforceable and, if not, whether they would still be enforceable against the debtor-guarantor of the leases.
Welcome to Part II of our series on the servicing of discharged mortgage debt (catch up on Part I). This part will discuss communications to discharged borrowers and evaluate various disclaimers that can be utilized.
The Revel decision provides a cautionary tale for purchasers under Section 363.
Mortgage servicers are plagued by their nebulous relationships with the borrowers who discharge their personal liability in bankruptcy. Issues arise when the borrower whose debt has been discharged continues to engage with the mortgage servicer. These activities include making monthly payments and requesting and participating in loss mitigation. There are few, if any, bright line rules regarding this common scenario.
Can a profit-sharing provision in a commercial lease survive assumption and assignment by a debtor? Analyzing such a provision, the Third Circuit answered “no,” finding the provision to constitute an unenforceable anti-assignment provision. Haggen Holdings, LLC v. Antone Corp, 739 Fed. Appx. 153 (2018).
Legal and Factual Background
Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that a mortgagee may enforce a mortgage against a mortgagor who signed, initialed, and acknowledged the mortgage even though the body of the mortgage agreement does not identify the mortgagor by name.
In so ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a mortgagee to use parole evidence to determine the mortgage signatory’s intent where there is an ambiguity.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan cannot modify the rights of a secured creditor whose claim is only secured by an “interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” On December 6, the Eleventh Circuit held that this provision prevents the discharge of a mortgage in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, regardless of whether the plan “provided for” the mortgage or whether the mortgagee filed a proof of claim.