When leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”) fail, the selling shareholders are litigation targets. A common suit is a claim by a bankruptcy trustee asserting constructive fraudulent transfer claims seeking to claw-back payments to the selling shareholders from the loan proceeds that financed the LBO.
One year ago, we wrote that 2022 would be remembered in the corporate bankruptcy world for the "crypto winter" that descended in November 2022 with the spectacular collapse of FTX Trading Ltd., Alameda Research, and approximately 130 other affiliated companies that ignited the meltdown of many other platforms, exchanges, lenders, and mining operations because they did business with FTX.
The scope of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" shielding certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers has long been a magnet for controversy, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court suggested (but did not hold) in Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
In a landmark decision,[1] the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed, for the first time, the precise duties that a controlling stockholder owes, and the standard of review that will apply, when a controlling stockholder takes actions to block a board of directors’ desired course of action — such as by removing directors or enacting a bylaw requiring a unanimous vote for board action
Election of Joe Graham to Partner
Joe Graham was elected partner in the New York office. This year, Joe played a leading role in the chapter 11 cases of Avaya, Benefytt and Diamond Sports. He regularly advises on out-of-court restructurings, bankruptcy litigation and distressed investments. Joe earned his J.D., magna cum laude, and his B.A. from the University of Notre Dame.
Kelley Cornish Inducted into “M&A Advisor Hall of Fame”
Restructurings defy a one-size fits all approach because every deal is unique and different tools are required to solve different problems. At one end of the restructuring continuum is the so-called “amend and extend,” where the credit agreement is amended to provide incremental liquidity, extend near-term maturities, modify covenants or some combination of the foregoing. This approach is fast and cost-efficient, but limited in its impact. At the other end of the spectrum is a restructuring through chapter 11.
In this article we explore the key trends which are currently shaping the landscape of private wealth disputes, including mental capacity as a central theme in private wealth disputes, trust insolvency and disputes relating to trustee investments.
Mental capacity
Mental capacity is increasingly a central theme on the landscape of private wealth disputes. Why? The starting point is that there is, more so than at any point previously, a wider recognition of the seismic consequences of establishing mental incapacity on the part of the relevant decision maker.
Elizabeth McColm, Brian Bolin and Mitchell Mengden, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison
This is an extract from the 2024 edition of GRR's the Americas Restructuring Review. The whole publication is available here.
Richard J Cooper, Lisa M Schweitzer and Richard C Minott, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
This is an extract from the 2024 edition of GRR's the Americas Restructuring Review. The whole publication is available here.
Any restructuring where there are multiple tiers of debt and lenders with different interests and views can be tricky. Lenders will try to anticipate these difficulties by entering into an intercreditor agreement (an ICA) setting each lender’s ranking and rights to enforce. Typically, an ICA will allow the senior lenders at least the option of taking the lead on an enforcement or a restructuring.