In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.

In First Southern Nat’l Bank v. Sunnyslope Hous. LP (In re Sunnyslope Hous. LP), 2017 BL 216965 (9th Cir. June 23, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held en banc that, in determining whether a chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor, the creditor’s collateral must be valued in accordance with the debtor’s intended use of the property, even if the property would realize more in a foreclosure sale because of the existence of restrictive covenants.

The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to sell bankruptcy estate assets "free and clear" of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of "any interest in such property," has generated a fair amount of controversy.

In Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health), 849 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2017), a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently addressed as a matter of apparent first impression whether or not a bankruptcy court can consider hypothetical preference actions in analyzing whether a creditor-transferee in preference litigation received more than it would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation, as required by section 547(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to "cure" a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a substantial majority of courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law.

In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to "cure" a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a substantial majority of courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law. See, e.g., JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v.

Key Points

Since the development of the doctrine of equitable mootness nearly a quarter century ago, courts have struggled to apply it in a way that strikes the appropriate balance between the need to ensure the finality and certainty of a chapter 11 plan for stakeholders, on the one hand, and the need to exercise the court’s jurisdiction and honor the right to appellate review, on the other. In JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Props. Inc. (In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc.), 2015 BL 302540 (9th Cir. Sept.

Interested chapter 11 plan investors, beware. A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that even after the chapter 11 plan has been confirmed and substantially consummated and your money has been invested, an appeal can go forward even if a victory for the appellants would change the chapter 11 plan terms on which you relied and substantially diminish the value of your investment.

Readers familiar with contract law undoubtedly know the “mailbox rule,” that an offer is accepted the moment a document goes in the mail.1 The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) recently dealt with its own variant of the mailbox rule: does the issuance of a check constitute a transfer of estate assets on the date the check is delivered or on the date it is honored?