The Ninth Circuit recently held that: (1) bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on all fraudulent transfer claims against non-claimants, whether brought under state or federal law, and (2) a defendant can waive such an argument by not asserting the applicability of Stern v. Marshall1 at the trial level.2 Further, in dicta, the court noted that bankruptcy courts may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in matters in which the bankruptcy court cannot issue final orders.
InIn re Juarez, 603 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. BAP 2019), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a question of first impression in the circuit with respect to property that is exempt from creditor reach: it adopted the view that, under the "new value exception" to the "absolute priority rule," an individual Chapter 11 debtor intending to retain such property need not make a "new value" contribution covering the value of the exemption.
Background
The court noted that the DOJ might prosecute cannabis-related businesses under the CSA, notwithstanding plan confirmation. Thus, Garvin may have foreclosed any future DOJ CSA-based noneconomic objections to cannabis reorganizations.
The United States Bankruptcy Code, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b)(6), caps a landlord's claim in bankruptcy for damages resulting from the termination of a real property lease. See In re PPI EnterprisesU.S., 324 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir. 2003). Under Section 502(b)(6), a landlord-creditor is entitled to rent reserve from the greater of one lease year or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining lease term.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a decision in Pacifica L 51, LLC v. New Investments, Inc. (In re New Investments, Inc.) (16 C.D.O.S. 11723, Nov. 4, 2016), which held that a secured creditor can collect default interest in connection with a cure under a chapter 11 plan, thereby rendering void the long-established rule under Great W. Bank & Tr. v.
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In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.
In First Southern Nat’l Bank v. Sunnyslope Hous. LP (In re Sunnyslope Hous. LP), 2017 BL 216965 (9th Cir. June 23, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held en banc that, in determining whether a chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor, the creditor’s collateral must be valued in accordance with the debtor’s intended use of the property, even if the property would realize more in a foreclosure sale because of the existence of restrictive covenants.
The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to sell bankruptcy estate assets "free and clear" of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of "any interest in such property," has generated a fair amount of controversy.