On May 14, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first ruling of this Term concerning a bankruptcy issue. In Hall v. U.S., S. Ct.

Clients often raise questions concerning the enforceability of arbitration clauses in bankruptcy proceedings. While this topic has been hotly debated for many years, a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012), reminds us that arbitration clauses are not sacrosanct and can be struck down by the court.

Asbestos settlement trusts are a major source of payment of asbestos claims in the United States, with over fifty such trusts instituted as of March, 2011.¹ While insurance recoveries are a principal source of funding for these trusts, courts generally have not allowed insurers to challenge chapter 11 plans where they are found to be “insurance neutral.” A plan is insurance neutral where the plan does not increase an insurer’s pre-petition liabilities or impair an insurer’s contractual rights under its insurance policies.

The Ninth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court properly denied a motion to compel arbitration against a debtor, notwithstanding the existence of a valid arbitration agreement covering the dispute, and held that the bankruptcy court properly exercised its discretion to adjudicate the claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.  In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (No.

The absolute priority rule of Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is a fundamental creditor protection in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. In general terms, the rule provides that if a class of unsecured creditors rejects a debtor’s reorganization plan and is not paid in full, junior creditors and equity interestholders may not receive or retain any property under the plan. The rule thus implements the general state-law principle that creditors are entitled to payment before shareholders, unless creditors agree to a different result.

Oftentimes in bankruptcy, when one entity files for bankruptcy relief, the subsidiaries or affiliates also file. Sometimes these entities are "substantively consolidated" for bankruptcy purposes, thus combining the assets and liabilities into a single pool and attributing them to a single entity. Substantive consolidation has been permitted when, for example, debtors have abused corporate formalities or creditors have treated the separate entities as a single economic unit and their affairs were hopelessly entangled.

2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).

Case Background

In its recent decision in Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.,¹ the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that meets the definition of a “single real estate” debtor under the Bankruptcy Code may not escape the consequences of such designation simply because it is a subsidiary of a group of companies with integrated and intertwined relationships among them. The decision may provide powerful rights not only to lenders to such entities in general, but could significantly enhance the rights of creditors of real estate owning single purpose entities.