A recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York may enhance the ability of bankruptcy trustees and creditors committees to challenge allegedly fraudulent transfers that could qualify for protection under the “safe harbor” of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. 

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v.

On May 30, 2014, hedge fund Moore Capital (Moore) brought suit against the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy estate (Lehman) in the Southern District of New York bankruptcy court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it acted properly when it terminated swap agreements and setoff termination amounts in the time between the filing of the parent company Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) and the eve of bankruptcy filings weeks later of Moore’s Lehman counterparties¹.

After more than two years of study on what needs fixing, the ABI Reform Commission proposed hundreds of discrete recommendations on refurbishing the Bankruptcy Code. The 396 page report addresses a wide variety of topics, from modifying the rights of secured lenders in large corporate workouts to creating a viable restructuring path for small businesses.

As we noted in Parts 1 and 2 of this series, any buyer of assets from a company in any degree of financial stress should be concerned about the transaction being attacked as a fraudulent transfer. Officers and directors of a selling entity also have concerns about this risk due to potential personal liability.

The Bankruptcy Code's so-called "cramdown" statute provides debtors with a significant tool that can be used to impose a reorganization plan upon recalcitrant secured lenders, subject to fulfillment of certain requirements. In particular, Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy court to approve a debtor's reorganization plan over the objections of a secured creditor so long as the plan is "fair and equitable" to the creditor.

In two recent decisions, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York adopted an interpretation of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the “TIA”) that may complicate future exchange offers and, in some cases, force bond restructurings that might otherwise have been completed out-of-court to be effectuated through a bankruptcy filing.1  In Marblegate Asset Management v.

New York's position as a global financial center means litigants often have sought to use New York courts as a forum to enforce judgments or arbitration awards against foreign entities. In reality, the burden of enforcement proceedings often falls on third parties, such as financial institutions that hold (or are alleged to hold) the judgment debtor's assets.

The timing of a bankruptcy petition filing is often a carefully calculated decision that a debtor makes to obtain certain protections of the Bankruptcy Code, most notably, the automatic stay, in advance of a looming event. In many cases, a debtor may be close to tripping a covenant, missing a debt payment, or a creditor may be attempting to foreclose on the debtor’s assets. The debtor must be cognizant of the timing of these events as the protections of the Bankruptcy Code only apply after the petition has been filed.

As discussed in Part 1 and Part 2 of this series, any buyer of assets from a company in any degree of financial stress should be concerned about the transaction being attacked as a fraudulent transfer.