Artists have long relied on art galleries to sell their works, and artists and galleries frequently use the legal construct of a “consignment” to facilitate the display and sale of art. In a consignment, the gallery does not acquire title to a work. Instead, the artist (the “consignor”) entrusts the work to the consignee—in most cases a gallery or auction house—for the consignee to sell. If and when an artwork is sold, the gallery pays the artist out of the proceeds of the sale.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held in Edward S. Weisfelner, as Litigation Trustee of the LB Creditor Trust v. Fund 1., et al.

It finally happened. On 12 December 2011, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Senate Bill 2713A into law. The bill, which was passed by the legislature in June, adds important provisions to the New York Insurance Law regarding the treatment of qualified financial contracts in an insurance insolvency proceeding.

On 30 November 2011, New York Senate Bill 2713A was delivered to the desk of Governor Andrew Cuomo for signature. If signed by the Governor, the bill will add provisions to the New York Insurance Law regarding the treatment of qualified financial contracts in an insurance insolvency proceeding. “Qualified financial contracts” include derivatives, securities lending, repurchase agreements, futures contracts and other financial instruments. These contracts are typically documented under master agreements providing for netting of obligations between the parties.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a cross-affiliate netting provision in an ISDA swap agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy. In the SIPA proceedings of Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), UBS AG (UBS) sought to offset UBS’s obligation to return excess collateral to LBI against claims purportedly owed by LBI to UBS subsidiaries, UBS Securities and UBS Financial Services.

A recent decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York regarding the terms of an engagement letter demonstrates the need to clearly articulate the intended purpose and scope of an engagement. As the case described below demonstrates, if there is any ambiguity with regard to whether or not a fee must be paid and/or when an engagement is terminated, the resolution of such ambiguity may depend upon the description of the engagement’s purpose.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 12-mc-115 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2014) [click for opinion]

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita, Bank. B.S.C. v. Bahr. Islamic Bank, No. 15-cv-03828 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) [click for opinion]

In a prior blog post, “Making Sense of The Circuit Split on the Enforcement of Make-Whole Provisions in Bankruptcy,” we discussed the circuit split on the enforcement of a make-whole premium triggered by a bankruptcy petition. Shortly after that post was published, the U.S.

The enforcement of a lender’s claim for a make-whole premium in a chapter 11 case has created significant controversy among legal practitioners and the courts. Notably, the three circuit courts of appeal that have addressed make-whole claims, i.e. the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits, have issued conflicting decisions on the nature of these claims and their allowance under the Bankruptcy Code. In this post we provide a brief summary of make-whole premiums and address the controversy among the circuits.