A recent decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York regarding the terms of an engagement letter demonstrates the need to clearly articulate the intended purpose and scope of an engagement. As the case described below demonstrates, if there is any ambiguity with regard to whether or not a fee must be paid and/or when an engagement is terminated, the resolution of such ambiguity may depend upon the description of the engagement’s purpose.
In a December 16, 2021, decision,1 Judge Colleen McMahon of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York reversed the bankruptcy court order confirming the Chapter 11 plan of Purdue Pharma, L.P.
On August 11, 2009, the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied five motions to dismiss bankruptcy cases filed by certain bankruptcy remote, special purpose subsidiaries (SPEs) of General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP). The motions were filed by or on behalf of secured lenders to the SPEs (Movants) who argued that the bankruptcy filings were inconsistent with the bankruptcy remote structures that they had negotiated with GGP.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “SDNY”) has been a longstanding epicenter of Chapter 11 filings. Historically seen as one of the more pro-debtor forums in the country, large companies often filed in the SDNY to take advantage of that stance. Some debtors appear to have attempted to direct their cases to specific judges within the district who were seen as particularly pro-debtor. One recent example was the bankruptcy filing by OxyContin producer, Purdue Pharma.
On September 1, 2021, Judge Robert Drain issued a much-anticipated oral ruling approving Purdue Pharma L.P.’s plan of reorganization. The plan, which has garnered significant attention from the media, legislators, academics, and practitioners, releases current and future members of the Sackler family and many of their associates and affiliated companies – none of whom filed for bankruptcy themselves – from liability in connection with any possible harm caused by OxyContin and other opioids that Purdue Pharma manufactured and distributed.
In its October 22, 2020, CNH Diversified Opportunities Master Account, L.P. v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 12-mc-115 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2014) [click for opinion]
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita, Bank. B.S.C. v. Bahr. Islamic Bank, No. 15-cv-03828 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) [click for opinion]
In a prior blog post, “Making Sense of The Circuit Split on the Enforcement of Make-Whole Provisions in Bankruptcy,” we discussed the circuit split on the enforcement of a make-whole premium triggered by a bankruptcy petition. Shortly after that post was published, the U.S.
The enforcement of a lender’s claim for a make-whole premium in a chapter 11 case has created significant controversy among legal practitioners and the courts. Notably, the three circuit courts of appeal that have addressed make-whole claims, i.e. the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits, have issued conflicting decisions on the nature of these claims and their allowance under the Bankruptcy Code. In this post we provide a brief summary of make-whole premiums and address the controversy among the circuits.