Heide v. Juve, (In re David L. Juve and Mona L. Juve), No. 11-6006, (8th Cir. BAP 09/16/2011) (Judges Schermer, Federman, and Nail).

How to Keep Follow-On Investments from Getting Squeezed

A recent federal district court appellate decision issued in the Enron chapter 11 case1 has ruled that the postpetition transfer of a prepetition bankruptcy claim from one party to another may insulate the transferred claim against certain types of attack based solely on conduct by a prior holder of the same claim. Whether a particular claim is protected depends upon how the claim was transferred.

If you hold a claim in bankruptcy by way of a transfer, you may need to be sure the transaction was accomplished by a sale and not merely by an assignment. Yet another decision highlights the growing complexity in bankruptcy claims as we discuss below.

A recent ruling by a federal court in New York has the potential to severely impact the $500 billion a year distressed debt market.

A fundamental premise of chapter 11 is that a debtor’s prebankruptcy management is presumed to provide the most capable and dedicated leadership for the company and should be allowed to continue operating the company’s business and managing its assets in bankruptcy while devising a viable business plan or other workable exit strategy. The chapter 11 “debtor-in-possession” (“DIP ”) is a concept rooted strongly in modern U.S. bankruptcy jurisprudence. Still, the presumption can be overcome.

The power to alter the relative priority of claims due to the misconduct of one creditor that causes injury to others is an important tool in the array of remedies available to a bankruptcy court in exercising its broad equitable powers. However, unlike provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that expressly authorize a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP ”) to seek the imposition of equitable remedies, such as lien or transfer avoidance, the statutory authority for equitable subordination—section 510(c)—does not specify exactly who may seek subordination of a claim.

Do officers of a public corporation have an affirmative obligation to monitor corporate affairs? Yes, according to Judge Walsh in his recently issued memorandum opinion in Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.).1 Although "Caremark" oversight liability had previously generally only been imposed on directors of public corporations, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that officers are not immune from such liability as a matter of law.

In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Corporate financial uncertainties or troubles frequently require corporate directors to make difficult choices that affect shareholders, creditors and others having an interest in the corporation. In that situation, the question naturally arises: Do directors' duties change when a corporation is experiencing financial difficulties, is nearing insolvency or becomes insolvent? The short answer is that the fiduciary duties of corporate directors under Delaware and Texas corporate law do not change, but that the ultimate beneficiaries of those duties may shift.