The Federal Court of Australia in Kaboko Mining Limited v Van Heerden (No 3) [2018] FCA 2055 handed down a significant decision which clarified the operation of "insolvency exclusion" clauses in a D&O liability insurance policy. The issue arose after Administrators commenced proceedings against four former directors of the company, and the insurer relied on an insolvency exclusion to decline to indemnify the former directors in respect of the claims made in the proceedings.

The facts

Receiverships usually arise from a secured creditor exercising their rights under a loan contract or mortgage following a default. But even where no default occurs, the Supreme Court of New South Wales has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to preserve the property of an association pending the resolution of a dispute about the management of the association’s property.

Jurisdiction

In a recent case, Emmett AJA of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to make an order to terminate the winding up of an incorporated association. In this article, we re-examine the principles with which the Court will have regard when determining whether to exercise its discretion to terminate the winding up of a company or incorporated association.

Background

The last few years have seen the Commonwealth increasingly crack down on misuse of the Fair Entitlements Guarantee, or FEG, program. The cases that have resulted have led to various disputes in insolvency law about the priorities of different creditors. The priorities to be applied in insolvent trading trusts have been one issue recently puzzling lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike. Relief may well be around the corner, however, as the High Court is set to weigh in.

What the FEG?

A company’s non-compliance with a statutory demand is the most common method of proving its insolvency in any winding up proceedings. Generally, if it does not make good the debt under the statutory demand within 21 days of service, the company will be presumed to be insolvent. What can a company do if it disputes the legitimacy of the debt?

The basics – compulsory winding up and statutory demands

The Limitations Act 1969 (NSW) (Limitations Act) establishes time limits within which plaintiffs must commence civil proceedings, including for the recovery of a debt. A failure to bring a claim within the relevant time period results in the claim lapsing, and the creditor losing its rights to enforce its debt. Accordingly, it is critical that creditors understand how the law restricts their ability to collect debts and any exceptions that they may rely upon as the limitation date approaches.

Prior to March 2017, any right to sue that comprised an asset of a bankrupt’s estate could only be litigated by the trustee of the bankrupt. The inability of a trustee to assign a bankrupt’s cause of action resulted in many such actions not being litigated due to factors such as a lack of resources. This position changed through the insertion into the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in Schedule 2 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy), which expressly permits a trustee to assign to a third party any right to sue that is held by of a bankrupt estate (see section 100-5).

The question in Pleash (Liquidator) v Tucker [2018] FCAFC 144 (29 August 2018) was whether financial documents of a discretionary trust ought to be produced for the purpose of a liquidator investigating the ability of an examinee (and former director of the company) to satisfy any judgment debt that may be obtained against him.

The statutory demand is a formidable card up a creditor’s sleeve that can result in a company being deemed to be insolvent if it does not pay the creditor’s debt within 21 days of service of the demand. Whether a statutory demand served on an incorporated body other than an Australian company will be effective largely depends on the State or Territory in which the incorporated body is based and whether it is served pursuant to the correct section of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).

What is a statutory demand?

Ordinarily, a company entering liquidation is considered the commercial equivalent of “game over”, “checkmate”, “the end”, “K.O” or whatever other synonyms creditors can conjure up. This would be true for the most part because, at the end of the liquidation process, the company is usually deregistered and ceases to exist.

However, in some cases it is possible for the liquidator, a creditor or a “contributory” (member) of the company to apply to the Court for an order terminating the winding up. If made, this would return control of the company to the directors.