On June 9, 2016, the New York State Court of Appeals, in Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2016 BL 184648 (N.Y. June 9, 2016), reversed a lower court decision, consistent with the overwhelming majority of federal court decisions, that the common interest doctrine under New York law is not limited to communications made in connection with pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.

On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145, holding that the "actual fraud" bar to discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses an individual debtor's knowing receipt of fraudulently transferred property.

Statutory Background

In December 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held as a matter of first impression in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor “under this title” to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its position sanctioning, under appropriate circumstances, nonconsensual third party release provisions in chapter 11 plans. In SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.(In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed bankruptcy and district court decisions approving a debtor’s chapter 11 plan that released the debtor’s former principals over the objection of a noninsider equity holder.

When existing interest holders attempt to retain ownership of a chapter 11 debtor after confirmation of a nonconsensual plan of reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code's plan confirmation requirements, including well-established rules regarding the classification and treatment of creditor claims and equity interests, can create formidable impediments to their reorganization strategy. In In re Platinum Corral, LLC, 2022 WL 127431 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2022), the U.S.

Whether a contract is "executory" such that it can be assumed, rejected, or assigned in bankruptcy is a question infrequently addressed by the circuit courts of appeals. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided some rare appellate court-level guidance on the question in Spyglass Media Group, LLC v. Bruce Cohen Productions (In re Weinstein Company Holdings LLC), 997 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2021).

Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides special protection for tenants if a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor was the lessor by giving the tenant the option of retaining possession of the leased premises. Although the provision clearly describes what rights a tenant has if it makes such an election, it does not unequivocally address the extent of the electing tenant's obligations under the rejected lease or any related agreements. The U.S.

On June 22, 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") issued an order concluding that FERC and the U.S. bankruptcy courts have concurrent jurisdiction to review and address the disposition of natural gas transportation agreements that a debtor seeks to reject under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.).

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to use "cash collateral" during the course of a bankruptcy case may be vital to the debtor's prospects for a successful reorganization. However, because of the unique nature of cash collateral, the Bankruptcy Code sets forth special rules that apply to the nonconsensual use of such collateral to protect the interests of the secured creditor involved. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington examined these requirements in In re Claar Cellars, LLC, 2020 WL 1238924 (Bankr. E.D.

In Short

The Situation: Should liquidators be removed under section 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) in circumstances where they engaged in preappointment discussions with a secured creditor, allegedly failed to investigate the company's affairs promptly, and retained the company's preappointment solicitors?