This afternoon, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg issued an order extending the temporary stay placed by a federal appeals court in New York last week on the sale of Chrysler LLC’s assets to a new company, to be partially owned by Italian automaker Fiat S.p.A., to allow opponents to the sale sufficient time to seek Supreme Court review.
In In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (Momentive), the court dismissed a senior lien creditors’ suit alleging that the junior lien creditors breached an intercreditor agreement (ICA) with respect to shared collateral by taking and supporting certain actions adverse to the senior lien creditors.
BACKGROUND
In In re Charles A. Grogan and Sarah A. Grogan, No. 11-65409 (Bankr. D. Ore. Sept. 10, 2013), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon confirmed the Debtors’ Third Amended Chapter 11 plan. The Debtors are Christmas tree farmers and their plan proposed to liquidate the majority of their Christmas tree farm and sell six major parcels of land. While the two main secured creditors were deemed to have rejected the plan, the court found the cram down standards of section 1129(b)(2)(A) were applicable.
On December 22, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware inIn re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II LLC 1 dismissed with prejudice a mezzanine borrower’s bankruptcy case for bad faith under Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the court clarified that the standard in the Third Circuit to evaluate the good faith of a debtor seeking shelter under the umbrella of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is an objective one and does not consider the subjective good faith of a debtor as do courts within the Secon d Circuit.
As the federal government and private markets make progress to quell economic recession and stimulate the engines of financial growth, recent headlines from the commercial real estate industry have focused on certain developments, such as the proposed changes in rating agency methodologies and the repeated false starts with the government’s TALF and PPIP programs.
In Lewis Brothers Bakeries, Inc. and Chicago Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2014 WL 2535294 (8th Cir. June 6, 2014)), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a perpetual, royalty-free, assignable, transferable, exclusive trademark license granted in connection with a substantially consummated asset purchase agreement was not an executory contract that could be assumed or rejected by the licensor-debtor in bankruptcy.
In Virginia Broadband, LLC (Bankr. W.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2013), the unsecured creditors committee moved to dismiss an LLC’s chapter 11 bankruptcy case alleging a flaw in the authorization of the LLC’s bankruptcy filing caused by an authorizing member’s individual bankruptcy filing. Specifically, the committee alleged that when the authorizing member filed his individual bankruptcy case, Virginia law divested him of his non-economic (voting) rights in the LLC.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has now weighed in on the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions. In Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., Docket Nos. 09–5122, 09–5142, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue of first impression—whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shields certain payments from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, extends to an issuer’s payment to redeem its commercial paper made before maturity.
Late Sunday night, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Gonzalez approved the sale of most of Chrysler's assets to Italian Automaker Fiat S.p.A., as contemplated in the Master Transaction Agreement between the two companies.
The Court of First Instance held in Re Up Energy Development Group Limited [2022] HKCFI 1329 that where the three core requirements for winding-up a foreign company under section 327(1) of the Companies (Winding up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) (CWUMPO) are satisfied, the mere fact that the foreign company has been ordered to be wound up by the court in its place of incorporation is not a ground for the Hong Kong court to decline the making of a winding up order.
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