Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

The United States Supreme Court, on July 1, 2014, granted a petition for certiorari in an important Seventh Circuit case limiting the power of bankruptcy courts to decide property disputes. Wellness International Network, Ltd. et al. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit had held last year that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to determine whether purported trust assets were property of the debtor’s estate.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on July 30, 2013, that a reorganized Chapter 11 debtor could reopen its closed case, enabling the debtor assignee to enforce a purchase option in a real property lease despite the lease’s “anti-assignment provisions.” In re Lazy Days’ RV Center Inc., 2013 WL 3886735, *5 (3d Cir. July 30, 2013).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 22, 2012, held that $1.6 million in political contributions made to five different political committees by Ponzi scheme defendants between 2000 and 2008 were fraudulent transfers made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors” under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 5207460 ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 2012).

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 19, 2010, corrected a bankruptcy court’s calculation of a secured lender group’s superpriority administrative claim more than two years after consummation of the debtor’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan. In re SCOPAC et al., F.3d__, 2010 WL 4069525, at *2-3, *5-6 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2010) (Jones, Ch.J.) [“Pacific Lumber II”]; see alsoIn re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 242 (5th Cir. 2009) [“Pacific Lumber I”] (plan “substantially consummated within weeks of confirmation”).

The Joint Administrators (the “Administrators”) of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (“LBIE”) announced on Oct. 5, 2009, that they are developing a contractual (i.e., non-judicial) alternative to their proposed Scheme of Arrangement, which is the subject of an appeal following a decision by the High Court in London that it lacks jurisdiction to implement the scheme.

The Prior Proposed Scheme of Arrangement

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that insiders who control the operations of a debtor owe a duty, as fiduciaries, to refrain from self-dealing. In re Brook Valley VII, Joint Venture (Lange v. Schropp), 496 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2007). The controlling insiders of two Chapter 11 debtors had thus breached their fiduciary duties to the debtors when they caused the debtors to consent to a foreclosure sale of estate properties and then secretly purchased the properties for themselves at the sale.

For the second time in four weeks, a U.S. district court questioned the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual third-party releases as part of a plan of reorganization.

On Oct. 27, 2020, Judge Marvin Isgur for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that (1) a make-whole premium was not interest or unmatured interest and thus not subject to disallowance, (2) a make-whole claim was enforceable as liquidated damages under New York law and (3) the solvent debtor exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and the Noteholders were entitled to postpetition interest at the contractual default rate.