Introduction
The recent decision of the London Commercial Court in PJSC Tatneft v Gennady Bogolyubov & Ors [2018] EWHC 1314 (Comm) highlights the importance that the Court will attach to full asset disclosure by a respondent to ensure the effectiveness of a freezing order, even in circumstances where the value of a respondent’s assets exceeds the sum frozen by the order.
Freezing Orders: What Are They?
U.S. courts generally agree that the substantive consolidation should be applied sparingly, and even more so when substantive consolidation of debtors with non-debtors is sought. While many opinions address the grounds for substantive consolidation, very few cases address standing and notice issues when the sought for consolidation is of non-debtor entities. The Oklahoma bankruptcy court recently addressed these two issues in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart.
In a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the General Motors case, the court held certain claimants were not afforded procedural due process with respect to the § 363 sale of General Motor Corporation’s assets in the bankruptcy case. As a result, the assets were not sold free and clear of these claims, and these claimants may now seek recovery against New GM.
When a debtor pays the market cost for goods and services provided to it by third-party vendors, these payments normally cannot be recovered as fraudulent transfers in the U.S. That is because the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value for the payments to its vendors and because the unsuspecting vendors can assert a good faith defense based on the value provided.
In its recent decision in Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that meets the definition of a “single real estate” debtor under the Bankruptcy Code may not escape the consequences of such designation simply because it is a subsidiary of a group of companies with integrated and intertwined relationships among them. The decision may provide powerful rights not only to lenders to such entities in general, but could significantly enhance the rights of creditors of real estate owning single purpose entities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that wages withheld as a voluntary 401(k) contribution prior to filing bankruptcy were not considered “disposable income” under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
A copy of the opinion in In re Camille Davis is available at: Link to Opinion.
An individual debtor (“consumer”) filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy with more than $200,000 in debt ($189,000 unsecured debt) and fewer than $39,000 in assets.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court lacks the power to enforce discharge injunctions entered in other districts, and that the debtors’ particular private education loans were not excepted from discharge.
A copy of the opinion in Crocker v. Navient Solutions, LLC is available at: Link to Opinion.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a mortgage loan with a post-plan maturity date was not discharged in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy because the plan did not “provide for” the debt and modify the repayment terms of the mortgage.
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the debt was not discharged because discharge would violate 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification provision for mortgages secured by the debtor’s principal residence.