Post-judgment interest is not something most lenders consider when making a loan. In fact, it is not ordinarily the subject of significant analysis even when litigation becomes necessary. Where the United States District Court is the preferred venue, however, parties easily can fall into the quandary of being stuck with the federal statutory post-judgment interest rate, which is currently less than 1% per annum.

Two recent cases serve as reminders the devil is truly in the details.

There are many tenants that are, shall we say, “problem children.” They pay late, open late, breach, junk up your strip or building, threaten, the works. Sometimes, the landlord finds it easier just to reach a lease termination agreement with such a tenant, with the parties walking away with a mutual release. If the lease is below market, or the landlord is really motivated to move this tenant along, the landlord even provides some “keys money” to terminate the lease.

The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed whether estate professionals could recover fees expended in defending fee applications. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. _____ (2015). A divided court ruled that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) allowed compensation only for “actual, necessary services rendered[,]” and that to allow fees for defending fee applications would be contrary to the statute and the “American Rule” that each litigant pay her own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.

The general rule is that an IRA is exempt from the claims of creditors. Indeed, the Federal Bankruptcy Code provides in Sections 522(b)(3)(C) and 522(d)(12) that a retirement plan, including an IRA and a Roth IRA, is an exempt asset in bankruptcy. However in Green v. Pershing L.L.C., N.D. Okla., No. 4:12-cv-00296-CVE-FHM, 10/22/12, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma ruled that the plan sponsor was not liable for turning over Mr. Green’s entire IRA to the IRS in response to the Notice of Levy and demand the IRS served on Pershing L.L.C. (“Pershing”).

In Coosemans Miami v. Arthur (In re Arthur), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida held last week that individuals in control of a PACA trust may still receive a bankruptcy discharge of debts arising from their breach of such PACA trust. A link to the opinion is here.

Overview

A decision rendered during the sometimes peaceful interlude between Christmas and New Year’s is worth reading, and heeding. Hurston v. Anzo (In re Hurston), Adv. Proc. No. 15-2026 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2016) is a helpful reminder to anyone representing lenders or creditors which are hell-bent-for-leather to pursue a non-dischargeability claim against a debtor that submits a false written statement (e.g., a personal financial statement) to obtain credit.

Individual debtors with old tax debts relating to late-filed tax returns may be surprised to find that those tax debts may not be dischargeable under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code due to the lateness of the tax filing. There is a current Circuit split regarding whether a late tax filing constitutes a “return” at all, which is critical to the dischargeability inquiry. The Ninth Circuit weighed in last week in In re Smith, 2016 WL 3749156 (9th Cir. July 13, 2016), further cementing the split.

In an appeal certified directly from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”) to the Court of Appeals, the Third Circuit issued a ruling upholding Judge Kevin Gross’s decision that a chapter 11 debtor-employer may reject the continuing terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, despite that the CBA expired post-petition.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision