Last June, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Baker Botts LLP v.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a lender that is on inquiry notice that its security interest in the collateral had been fraudulently conveyed may lose its secured status.
However, the Court also held that the lender's negligence here did not amount to "purposeful avoidance of the truth" sufficient to justify application of the doctrine of equitable subordination, which allows a bankruptcy court to reduce the priority of a claim in bankruptcy.
In December 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held as a matter of first impression in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor “under this title” to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Residential Communities: Proposed Amendment to Allow Owners' Attorneys at Association Board Meetings
In In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 540 B.R. 109 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015), the bankruptcy court ruled that, although a chapter 11 plan proposed by solvent debtors need not provide for the payment of postpetition interest on unsecured claims to render the claims unimpaired, the plan must provide that the court has the discretion to award such interest at an appropriate rate “under equitable principles.” The ruling highlights the important distinction between the allowance of a claim in bankruptcy and the permissible treatment of the claim under a chapter 11 plan.
(6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2016)
The Sixth Circuit affirms the district court’s finding that the Chapter 11 plan was proposed in bad faith. The plan proposed to pay small claims in full but over a 60-day period. This class of claims was technically impaired due to the delayed payment and it voted to accept the plan. The principle secured lender appealed. The Court finds that the plan was not proposed in good faith, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), because it was designed to circumvent § 1129(a)(10)’s requirement for an accepting impaired class of claims. Opinion below.
On January 25, Lehman and JPMorgan announced a settlement to resolve several aspects of the contentious and multifaceted Lehman-JPMorgan dispute that has lingered throughout Lehman’s bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court will hear a motion to approve the settlement on February 8.
It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement. However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?
Yesterday’s post discussed the recent appellate ruling in Sentinel’s bankruptcy, Grede v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp.
It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement. However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?