Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, subject to certain exceptions, that the Bankruptcy Code “does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” Debts are considered “mutual” when they are due to and from the same persons or entities in the same capacity.
Few areas of law are as confusing—or as important to understand—as the growing
intersection of employment and bankruptcy law. In recent years, funding shortfalls
in multi-employer pension plans, which cover roughly 20 percent of U.S. workers
with defined-benefit plans, have increased pressure on participating employers
to reduce their contributions or even withdraw entirely. Although employers taking
these actions would incur withdrawal liability as a consequence, that liability can
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York overseeing the Residential Capital (“ResCap”) cases issued an opinion on November 15, 2013 (the “Opinion”)2 allowing the unamortized interest associated with original issue discount (“OID”) that was generated in a fair market value exchange and claimed by ResCap’s junior secured noteholders (the “Holders”). While the OID ruling is only one component of the Opinion,3 it may have far reaching implications, as already evidenced in the pricing of other OID notes that were the product of fair market value exchanges.
On November 15, 2013, Judge Martin Glenn of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that original issue discount (“OID”) created in a prepetition “fair market value” debt exchange is not disallowable in bankruptcy.1 This noteworthy ruling provides important and long-awaited guidance for the investing community on the question left open by the Second Circuit’s 1992 ruling in LTV Corp. v. Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.).2
BACKGROUND
Commercial landlords hailed as a significant victory the enactment in 2005 of a 210-day “drop dead” period after which a lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee is deemed rejected unless, prior to the expiration of the period, a chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) or bankruptcy trustee assumes or rejects the lease.
InGrayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined whether certain securities transferred and payments made during the course of a Ponzi scheme could be avoided as fraudulent transfers under sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court upheld a judgment denying avoidance of pre-bankruptcy transfers of securities because the debtor did not have an “interest” in the securities at the time of the transfers.
In a decision that demonstrates the potentially broad impact of the forthcoming Supreme Court decision in Bellingham, the Fifth Circuit held that bankruptcy judges may not “determine” non-core matters even where the parties consent. BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. (In re BP RE, L.P.), No. 12-51270 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2013), see Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S.Ct. 2880 (2013) (set for oral argument January 14, 2014).
- Receiver: court’s inherent equitable power to appoint receiver over non-profit condominium association not limited to categories set forth in Florida Statutes – Granada Lakes Villas Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v Metro-Dade Invs. Co., No. SC11-2590 (Fla. Oct.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently confirmed that a channeling injunction pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a lender’s security interest in accounts was not perfected because a reference to “proceeds” in the lender’s UCC financing statement did not expressly refer to “accounts.” The Sixth Circuit surprisingly interpreted the definition of “proceeds”1 in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to exclude “accounts”2 (despite and without reference to provisions of UCC Article 9 to the contrary).