On June 12, 2014, the Supreme Court held that assets of an “inherited IRA” are not exempt from the IRA holder’s bankruptcy estate and are subject to the claims of creditors in bankruptcy. (Clark v. Rameker, Sup. Ct. Slip Op. No. 13-299, affirming In re Clark, 714 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2013). In Clark, the petitioner, Heidi Heffron-Clark, inherited an IRA worth approximately $450,000. The IRA was originally established by the petitioner’s mother as a traditional IRA and became an inherited IRA upon her death in 2001.
As bankruptcy practitioners will recall, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) that bankruptcy courts, as non-Article III courts, “lack[] the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim,” even though Congress had classified these types of proceedings as core – and thus authorized federal bankruptcy courts to hear and decide them.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6768 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2014) recently ruled on a number of issues critical to valuing a secured claim in bankruptcy. Specifically, the court 1) endorsed the use of a “flexible approach” to value collateral under the circumstances of this case, 2) recognized that the date collateral should be valued is the lender’s burden to prove, and 3) confirmed that the pre-petition agreement’s default interest rate should generally be used to determine the post-petition interest rate.
Q: When is a retirement account not a retirement account?
A: When it's an inherited IRA and the owner is bankrupt.
Trademark Licenses At Risk. I have written a number of times on the blog about the impact of bankruptcy on trademark licenses, with a special focus on the risk that trademark licensees face if their licensors file bankruptcy.
In the approach to bankruptcy, struggling businesses may experience problems performing their contracts, and counterparties often see trouble on the horizon. What can a non-debtor counterparty do to protect itself? And how are its rights impaired when the debtor finally commences a bankruptcy case?
The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.
On June 9, 2014, in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.),1 a much-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court addressed how bankruptcy courts should adjudicate so-called Stern claims. Stern claims are “core” claims over which bankruptcy courts have statutory authority to enter orders and judgments,2 but which authority the Supreme Court previously held in Stern v. Marshall3 was not permitted (at least with respect to certain issues) under Article III of the United States Constitution.
In Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee of Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., — U.S. — (June 9, 2014) (Bellingham), the Supreme Court shed light on how bankruptcy judges must proceed when confronted with claims that they cannot finally adjudicate as non-Article III judges.
The First Circuit held in a recent decision that bankruptcy courts have wide discretion to apply a flexible approach when valuing (and potentially re-valuing) collateral for purposes of determining whether a secured creditor is oversecured and therefore entitled to receive postpetition interest pursuant to section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.