Today, the Vermont Supreme Court issues its opinion in the Ambassador in Liquidation case striking down the estate’s previously-published 12/31/13 bar date for final Proofs of Claim. The Ambassador Ins. Co. liquidation has been in process since 1987. After the estate obtained over $300,000,000 in reinsurance and settlement proceeds from its former auditing firm, the estate essentially became “solvent”—paying Priority Four claims at 100 percent (plus interest).
The timing of a bankruptcy petition filing is often a carefully calculated decision that a debtor makes to obtain certain protections of the Bankruptcy Code, most notably, the automatic stay, in advance of a looming event. In many cases, a debtor may be close to tripping a covenant, missing a debt payment, or a creditor may be attempting to foreclose on the debtor’s assets. The debtor must be cognizant of the timing of these events as the protections of the Bankruptcy Code only apply after the petition has been filed.
A lender cannot rely on its subjective intent in claiming that an otherwise properly filed UCC termination is ineffective, according to a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Put another way, if a lender authorizes a termination statement, the termination is valid upon filing such UCC-3 even if the authorization was mistakenly given. While this result is not surprising, it does put lenders (and their counsel) on notice to be diligent in reviewing and authorizing the filing of UCC termination statements.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.
The automatic stay is a powerful tool of the Bankruptcy Code, affording debtors a breathing spell from creditors seeking payment. Section 362(k)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code reinforces the stay by allowing individual debtors to recover actual and punitive damages for willful violations.
As we explained in a post yesterday, the Seventh Circuit in In re Bronk (Cirilli v.
Last week’s Supreme Court arguments on bankruptcy jurisdiction in Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935 (S.Ct.), are enough to strike fear into the heart of any bankruptcy buff. What emerges from the transcript of the oral arguments is, in a word, confusion. This bodes ill for an early resolution of the upheaval created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), limiting the power of bankruptcy judges to decide certain matters that arise in bankruptcy proceedings.
In re Bronk (Cirilli v. Bronk), No. 13-1123 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2015), resolved a couple of “questions of first impression,” slip op.
In December 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code was applicable to Chapter 15 cases. In Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir.