BUSSON-SOKOLIK v. MILWAUKEE SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING (February 10, 2011)
The Federal Bankruptcy Act prohibits public and private employers from engaging in various discriminatory acts against individuals because they have filed for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 525. Inexplicably, the statutes applicable to public and private employers are not identical. The law applicable to a public employer, for example, specifically provides that it "may not . . . deny employment to" one who has filed for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). This "deny employment to" language does not appear in the statute for private employers. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.
As discussed in previous posts on this site, back in December the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a summary order that reversed the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of the reorganization plan (the “Plan”) of DBSD North America, f/k/a ICO North America (“DBSD”).
On February 10, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a memorandum decision addressing whether the alleged holder of a mortgage loan had sufficient status as a secured creditor to seek relief from the automatic stay to pursue a foreclosure action.1 After resolving the primary issue in controversy on purely procedural grounds and granting the requested relief, the Court analyzed whether an entity that acquires its interest in a mortgage loan through an assignment from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
On Feb. 18, 2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) held that (i) an assignment of unsecured contract claims from AT&T to ReGen Capital I, Inc. (“ReGen”) was broad enough to include right to receive “cure” payments in the event the debtor, UAL Corporation (“United”), assumed the underlying executory contracts, but (ii) ReGen could not successfully assert a “cure” claim because United had not assumed the executory contracts, even though United’s confirmed plan of reorganization included them on a list of assumed contracts. ReGen Capital I, Inc. v. UAL Corp.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, applying Illinois law, has ruled that an insolvency exclusion barred coverage for claims arising out of an insurance broker’s placement of coverage with an insolvent insurance association. American Automobile Insurance Co. v. B.D. McClure & Associates, Ltd., 2011 WL 211204 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2011).
On February 22nd, the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the liquidation of Lehman Brothers' broker-dealer business denied motions seeking to modify the order approving the sale of the business to Barclays Capital. The Court noted the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the sale, the affirmance of that sale order, and movants' failure to challenge the order for one year. The court held that even if the evidence presented here were known in 2008, the result would have been the same, i.e., the sale would have been approved.
In a long-awaited decision released on February 22, 2011, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of Barclays Capital in Lehman Brothers Holding Inc.’s multi-billion-dollar lawsuit arising out of the sale of Lehman’s investment banking and brokerage assets, which occurred in September of 2008.
MERS’s authority to assign mortgages was called into question by a bankruptcy court in New York. In re Agard, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011). In response to the servicer’s motion for relief from the automatic stay, the debtor challenged the servicer’s standing on the ground that MERS lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to the servicer. Because a state court had previously entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of the servicer, the court was compelled by the Rooker Feldman doctrine to reject the debtor’s claims.