Hoku, a publicly-owned Delaware corporation, filed for bankruptcy with just $8 million in assets compared to a relatively staggering $1.3 billion in liabilities, much of which was funded debt. In light of this significant insolvency, Hoku’s chapter 7 trustee brought various breach of fiduciary claims against Hoku’s board of directors, including one akin to a claim for “deepening insolvency.” As the case of Hopkins v.
The Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims, holding that the defendant’s conduct—filing proofs of claim based on time-barred debts—does not violate the FDCPA. SeeIn re Dubois, 2016 WL4474156 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016). In the case, each of the two plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and the defendant filed proofs of claim in the plaintiffs’ cases.
Burr & Forman lawyers won a significant victory in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this month. In the case In re: David A. Failla, — F.3d — (2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that a person who agrees to “surrender” his house in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) may not oppose the creditor’s foreclosure action in state court. Our firm was one of the first to advance this argument, and many, but not all, of the bankruptcy judges in Florida agreed with our interpretation of surrender under the bankruptcy code and related case law.
Under Section 521(a)(2)(A) of the federal bankruptcy code, a debtor in a chapter 7 bankruptcy must file a statement within 30 days of the bankruptcy filing notifying the court, creditors and the trustee whether the debtor intends to retain or surrender property encumbered by a mortgage. In its October, 2016 decision in the case of In re Failla, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming rulings from the bankruptcy court and the federal district court, held that once a chapter 7 debtor elects to "surrender" mortgaged property, he is precluded from thereafter opposing
(6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2016)
In the decision of Motors Liquidation Co. Avoidance Action Trust v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 552 B.R. 253 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016), the SDNY bankruptcy court held that prepetition interest payments on a term loan did not qualify as “settlement payments” under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On October 27, 2016, Chief Judge Brendan L. Shannon of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion overruling objections to the claims of Seegrid’s former CEO. A copy of the Opinion is available here.
Among other strategic considerations a financially troubled company must grapple with as it prepares for a potential bankruptcy filing is how best to effectively implement necessary workforce reductions as part of its overall reorganization efforts. A workforce reduction could potentially give rise to severance and other employee obligations, and, under certain circumstances, could also give rise to significant WARN Act claims.
In our previous two news alerts,1 we examined decisions that potentially undermine key elements of the legal structures that lenders created in response to their experiences in the United States Bankruptcy Courts during the real estate downturn of 1988 through 1992, including the involuntary restructure of their indebtedness and liens under the cram-down provisions of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Codeâ€).
“[T]he bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the debtor’s former employees’] motion to compel arbitration” when the dispute turned on the relative priority of their claims, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Oct. 6, 2016. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 2016 WL 5853265, *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2016). The Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) trustee in the liquidation of Lehman Brothers Inc.