In 2015, Distressing Matters reported on the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp., wherein that panel ruled that, in rare circumstances, bankruptcy courts may approve the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory priority scheme.
On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.
Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 ruling,1 to vacate the rulings by the District Court of the Southern District of New York in the Marblegate dispute, reopens the traditional flexibility that companies have had for consent solicitations as part of liability management transactions, although some uncertainty may continue to persist.
Background
In a highly anticipated decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017), that, without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions which "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
Overview
In Asarco, LLC v. Noranda Mining, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that representations made to the bankruptcy court that the Debtor’s settlement of environmental claims reflected only the Debtor’s share of the cleanup costs did not judicially estop the Debtor from brining a contribution claim against another potentially responsible party for those same costs.
Can a bankruptcy court order the “structured dismissal” of a Chapter 11 case if such dismissal would alter the ordinary priority rules for creditor distributions under the Bankruptcy Code? In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. (March 22, 2017) (Jevic), the Supreme Court recently determined that such an order cannot issue without consent from all affected creditors even in “rare cases in which courts could find sufficient reasons to disregard priority.”
We are all very used to (and very bored of) the on-going debate of what actually constitutes “the media” or “legitimate news.” In most instances, this sort of debate pits exclusive, Columbia-educated, “proper” journalists against those who have large on-line followings and eschew any association with a Dickensian-era newspaper.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the dismissal of a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim arising out of a non-judicial foreclosure. The Ninth Circuit ruled that section 1692f(6) of the FDCPA applies to non-judicial foreclosure activity.
A copy of the opinion in Dale Dowers v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC is available at: Link to Opinion.
A complaint filed March 23 by the bankruptcy trustee for Lam Cloud Management, LLC in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey challenges two small business financing models: (i) merchant cash advances (“MCAs”); and (ii) small business loans originated under bank partnerships.