The Bottom Line
In In re Short Bark Industries Inc., 17-11502 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware read the Supreme Court’s holding in Jevic narrowly in connection with a settlement of a dispute on DIP financing.
On August 10, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court rescinded the grant of certiorari in PEM Entities LLC v. Levin on the grounds that review had been “improvidently granted.” The case seemingly provided a perfect vehicle to resolve the circuit split on whether federal or state law governs debt recharacterization in bankruptcy, and less than two months after the Court first agreed to hear the case, its dismissal came as a surprise.
In recent years, courts have become increasingly critical of the doctrine of equitable mootness, a judicially created abstention doctrine that allows appellate courts to dismiss appeals from a bankruptcy court’s confirmation order in certain circumstances. Although the doctrine is meant to be applied only sparingly, to avoid unscrambling complex reorganizations on appeal, it has been invoked in noncomplex cases or where limited relief is practicable. As a result, some circuit courts have urged a more limited application of the doctrine.
Traditional thinking in the private placement noteholder community has been the “model form” approach to make-whole amounts created an enforceable liquidated damages claim in the event of voluntary or involuntary acceleration by the note issuer, including upon a bankruptcy filing. That thinking has been tested in the market as a result of a number of recent decisions involving public notes where courts have interpreted the specific indenture language to deny a make-whole claim.
The court awarded OpCo Noteholders in excess of $320 million in Make-Whole Amount and post-petition interest, confirming that make-whole is an enforceable liquidated damage claim.
Some “D&O policies” (Directors and Officers liability policies) exclude claims for losses “arising out of” the prior wrongful acts of officers or directors. The Eleventh Circuit recently interpreted the phrase “arising out of” broadly, finding that it is not a difficult standard to meet. Zucker for BankUnited Financial Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Insurance Co., -- F.3d -- , 2017 WL 2115414, *7 (2017) (determining that under Florida law “‘arising out of’ . . . has a broad meaning even when used in a policy exclusion”); but see Brown v. American Intern.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a decision in July, 2017 that holds banks liable for diversion of funds in violation of New York’s lien law, when it should have known of the trust nature of the funds it receives. In Delco Electrical Corp. v. Wells Fargo Capital Finance, Inc., 2017 WL 3311224 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2017), Teltronics, Inc. (“Teltronics”) contracted with the New York City Department of Education to make telecommunications-related improvements at public schools from 2007-2011.
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sep. 8, 2017)
The bankruptcy court grants the creditor’s motion to dismiss the Chapter 7 case because the debtor failed to rebut the “presumption of abuse.” The debtor argued she should be permitted to file under Chapter 7 because of special circumstances, pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(B). The debtor argued that she was a “stockbroker” and thus not eligible for Chapter 11 or 13. However, the court determines that she is not a stockbroker because she is merely an employee, rather than a stockbroker as defined by § 101. Opinion below.
Judge: Wise