Peekay Acquisition, LLC, along with sixteen (16) of its affiliates and subsidiaries, has filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Lead Case No. 17-11722). Headquartered in Auburn, Washington, Peekay is a leading specialty retailer of a broad selection of lingerie, sexual health and wellness products and accessories.

In Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348, 2017 BL 161314 (U.S. May 15, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a credit collection agency does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") when it files a claim in a bankruptcy case to collect on a debt which would be time-barred in another court.

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. July 28, 2017)

Do a lessee’s possessory interests in real property survive a “free and clear” sale of the property under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code? In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said “no,” holding that section 365(h) did not protect the interest of the lessee in the context of a section 363 sale when there had been no prior formal rejection of the lease under section 365.

Timing is key to valuation of all types and in all contexts. But in bankruptcy, valuation timing can take on heightened importance because a central element of bankruptcy involves distributing value as of a specific point in time. Higher valuation means larger creditor recoveries in bankruptcy, and lower valuation means smaller creditor recoveries. Valuation can also affect which creditors receive those recoveries and the extent to which various stakeholders retain an interest in the reorganized debtor.

On July 19, 2017, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc., et al. v. J. Aron & Company, et al.(In re Semcrude, L.P., et al.), Case Nos. 15-3094, 15-3095, 15-3096 and 15-3097, affirming the Delaware bankruptcy court and district court, holding that upstream oil producers do not have an automatically perfected statutory security interest in oil sold even if Texas or Kansas law applied.

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2017)

In Royal Bank of Canada v. Casselman, three motions were brought before the Court. First, a continuation of a motion for approval and directions brought by the receiver. Second, a motion to allow counsel for the debtor to withdraw as lawyer of record. Third, a motion by the Sexton Group Ltd.

This two-part article discusses the key concerns, from a non-consolidation and true sale perspective, that arise when an insurance company, as opposed to a bankruptcy-eligible entity, is a sponsor/seller in a securitization or similar structured finance transaction. This Part One introduces the main contrasts between non-con and true sale analysis in a traditional bankruptcy context and such analysis in an insurance-law scenario.

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.