It’s no secret that Delaware, New York (Southern District), and Texas (at least since the oil and gas crisis) have become known as the “hotspots” for filing large chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Whether due to desirable precedent, well qualified judges, the responsiveness of the Courts to the need for prompt scheduling of hearings, or a sense of uniformity, most large companies have historically chosen to file in these venues. However, these popular venues appear to have a rival.

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 22, 2017)

In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.

In In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2017 BL 335015 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2017), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that certain private-placement noteholders were entitled to receive a "make-whole" premium in excess of $200 million under a chapter 11 plan that rendered the noteholders’ claims unimpaired.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in its recent decision in Town Center Flats, LLC v. ECP Commercial II LLC (In re Town Center Flats LLC), Case No. 16-1812 (6th Cir. May 2, 2017), reinforces an option that commercial lenders in certain states have as a defensive strategy in anticipation of a single-asset real estate bankruptcy involving a defaulted multi-family or hotel loans. The decision is dependent on state law regarding the effect of an absolute assignment of rents and the exercise of the lender’s rights under such an assignment clause.

In In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 2017 BL 354864 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 3, 2017), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that it had the constitutional authority to grant nonconsensual third-party releases in an order confirming the chapter 11 plan of laboratory testing company Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC ("Millennium"). In so ruling, the court rejected an argument made by a group of creditors that a provision in Millennium’s plan releasing racketeering claims against the debtor’s former shareholders was prohibited by the U.S.

The Bankruptcy Code gives secured creditors certain rights and protections. For secured creditors whose collateral is worth more than the creditor’s claim, these rights may include payment of attorney’s fees and post-petition interest at a rate agreed to in the debtor’s and creditor’s prepetition agreement. A chapter 11 bankruptcy plan, however, may have provisions in it that expressly takes away a secured creditor’s right to post-petition interest.

In Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 872 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gave an unsecured creditors’ committee an "unconditional right to intervene," within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), in an adversary proceeding commenced during the course of a bankruptcy case.

On November 9, responding to a request from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Solicitor General filed a brief at the Court recommending that the petition for writ of certiorari in Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, No. 16-11911, be granted. The petition, seeking review of a unanimous panel decision of the Eleventh Circuit, presents the question of “whether (and, if so, when) a statement concerning a specific asset can be a ‘statement respecting the debtor's . . .

In deciding whether to afford administrative priority to claims arising from goods shipped shortly before a debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the Third Circuit, in In re World Imports Ltd., 862 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. July 10, 2017), interpreted the term “received” under section 503(b)(9) to mean “physical possession.” In effect, the Third Circuit’s decision provides additional protection to trade vendors that conduct business with distressed debtors.