On March 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit denied a bank’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that arbitration of the debtor’s claims would present an inherent conflict with the intent of the Bankruptcy Code because the dispute concerns a core bankruptcy proceeding.

Last week, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.1 the Supreme Court settled a split in the circuit courts, unanimously holding that the safe harbor provision created by 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), 11 U.S.C.

It’s been an interesting couple of weeks for bankruptcy at the United States Supreme Court with two bankruptcy-related decisions released in back-to-back weeks. Last week, the Supreme Court issued an important decision delineating the scope of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code (discussed here [1] for those who missed it).

Over the last twenty years, courts have increasingly insulated transactions from avoidance as fraudulent transfers by invoking the so-called “settlement payment” defense codified in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. The safe harbor has been interpreted in the Second and Third Circuits and elsewhere as precluding debtors, trustees and creditors committees from clawing back otherwise objectionable pre-bankruptcy transfers solely because the money at issue flowed through a bank or other financial institution.

Client Alert

In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 2018 WL 1054879 (Feb. 27, 2018) has made it easier for bankruptcy trustees to claw back money received as part of certain transactions, while emphasizing that bankruptcy law still protects the financial institutions that facilitate those transactions. The transfers at issue in Merit Management were not a debtor’s ordinary loan payments to a lender.

On March 5, 2018 the United State Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in U.S. Bank NA v. The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. ___ (2018), answering the narrow question of what is the proper standard of review for appellate courts in reviewing a bankruptcy court’s determination of non-statutory insider status.

In another decision affecting Chapter 11 cases, U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, --- S. Ct. ---, 2018 WL 1143822 (2018), on March 5, 2018, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Kagan, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to review the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of a mixed question of fact and law for clear error, rather than de novo.

On January 31, 2018, the Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed,[1] in a 3-1 decision, the Kings County Supreme Court Commercial Division’s decision, denying 159 MP Corp. and 240 Bedford Ave Realty Holding Corp.’s (collectively the “Tenants”) motion for a Yellowstone injunction.

A corporation ordinarily is not liable for the debts of other entities or for the debts of its owners in the absence of an express agreement, such as a guarantee. However, a creditor of one company may try to impose liability on one or more non-debtor entities under “alter ego” or “successor liability” theories in certain circumstances.