I. Introduction
On April 22, 2013, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re School Specialty upheld the enforceability of a make-whole premium triggered by the pre-petition acceleration of a secured term loan.1 The decision re-affirms that bankruptcy courts will respect properly drafted make-whole premiums that pass muster under applicable state law.
On April 22, 2013, Judge Kevin J. Carey of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware allowed a lender’s $23.7 million pre-petition make-whole claim, representing approximately 37% of the outstanding principal of the loan, in the Chapter 11 case of School Specialty, Inc. 1 In a decision that will win cheers from the lending community, the court enforced the clear terms of the loan agreement over the objection of the Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, holding that the make-whole claim was enforceable under New York law.
BACKGROUND
Indentures often contain make-whole premiums payable upon early redemption of the debt, and term B loan agreements often include "soft call" protection in the form of prepayment premiums during the early life of the loan. If the debt issuer becomes subject to a chapter 11 proceeding after the debt issuance, the question then arises as to how this payment obligation is to be treated: Does the make-whole or prepayment premium constitute unmatured interest due as a result of the debt acceleration, which would be disallowed, or is it liquidated damages?
In Wells Fargo Bank Northwest v. US Airways, Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 52188(U) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 1, 2011), Justice Bernard J. Fried held that a liquidated damages provision requiring payment of a holdover fee equal to twice the monthly rent was reasonable and did not function as a penalty under New York contract law. The case arose from three aircraft sale and leaseback transactions, pursuant to which Defendant US Airways, Inc. (“US Airways”), sold to Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank Northwest (“Wells Fargo”), and Wells Fargo leased back to US Airways, three Boeing 737 aircraft.
In the most recent ruling in long-running litigation styled AMG National Trust Bank v. Ries, NO. 06-CV4337, 09-cv-3061 (E.D. Pa.) (decided Dec.
Liquidation is one of those odd legal terms that has multiple meanings, some intuitive and others unexpected. In non-legal parlance, liquidation is what happens when you don’t pay your loan shark, or when you cross James Bond. Legal terminology has an analogous usage, such as liquidation of a business in bankruptcy proceedings. But it also has an entirely different meaning that is of great importance in the construction industry — liquidation of damages. Ironically, liquidation of damages is one of the ways that a contractor may prevent liquidation of its business.
In In re Calpine Corporation, 2007 WL 685595 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered the issue of whether secured creditors whose debt was being paid prior to its original maturity date were entitled to a prepayment premium.
In Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a lessor-claimant whose lease was rejected pursuant to section 365(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was entitled to a claim for future-rent damages against the debtor, even though the lessor had entered into a nearly identical substitute lease. The Court concluded that efforts to mitigate damages by the lessor would not be considered in reducing the actual damage claim when those efforts failed to reduce the actual harm suffered by the lessor.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee confirmed that an equipment lessor is entitled to enforce the “hell or high water” provision of an equipment lease.
“… [B]ecause Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a reorganized solvent debtor had to “pay what it promised now that it is financially capable.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2022 WL 8025329, *1, (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (2-1). Moreover, “given [the debtor’s ] solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon … contractual default rate …,” not the “much lower Federal Judgment Rate …,” held the court. Id.