In a decision with potentially broad implications, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently determined that payments made to former shareholders of a privately held company in a leveraged buyout transaction are protected as "settlement payments" pursuant to section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Elaborating on its Resorts decision of ten years ago concerning payments to shareholders in a public leveraged buyout,1 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ruled in In re Plassein Int’l, Corp.2 that the “settlement payment” exemption of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code also insulates selling shareholders in a private LBO from fraudulent transfer liability.
As the economy boomed in 2005-2007 and leverage increased to staggering levels, LBOs took a prominent place in the deal economy. During that time, investors completed 313 LBOs in the United States for approximately $630 billion.1 Following the recent economic downturn, many of those LBOs have become sources of controversy in a number of bankruptcies and restructurings - prominent examples include Tribune Co. and Lyondell Chemical Co.
A bankruptcy court wrote that filing for bankruptcy is “powerful magic.” By finding federal preemption of state law fraudulent transfer claims, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in the long-running Tribune case showed just how powerful this magic can be.
Seeking to have an independent examiner investigate a debtor or its management can be a powerful tool available to creditors and other interested parties in a bankruptcy case. Typically, a party might request that an examiner be appointed if the debtor or its management is suspected of fraud or other misconduct. The low cost associated with making the request, together with recent positive outcomes for requesting creditors, may help to increasingly popularize the use of examiner requests by parties seeking leverage in bankruptcy plan negotiations.
The recent restructuring of Autodis, a French car parts company, is a perfect illustration of the positive consequences of the reform of the French bankruptcy code in effect since February 15, 2009. The combined use of the French conciliation procedure for the operating company and the French safeguard procedures for the holding companies were agreed upon between the debtor and its creditors pursuant to the first pre-pack agreement executed in France.
Background
The aggregate value of private-equity acquisitions worldwide in 2006 exceeded $660 billion. If this number seems mind-boggling, consider that this record-breaking volume of transactions appears well on the way to being eclipsed in 2007. Even with corporate financing for leveraged buyouts harder to come by as a consequence of the sub-prime mortgage fallout, there is, by some estimates, $300 billion sitting globally in private-equity funds. Already on tap or completed in 2007: a $32 billion takeover of energy company TXU Corp.
In a recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Weisfelner, v. Fund 1, et al. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a bankruptcy examiner to investigate the debtor with respect to allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct or mismanagement. The right examiner, with a clearly defined mission, will have a major influence on the bankruptcy process. The difference between a successful financial restructuring or liquidation-resulting in substantial recoveries for the key constituencies-and a time-consuming (and asset-consuming) meltdown, can depend on the approach of the examiner and the examiner's support team.