Last year, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Merit, unanimously ruling that a buyout transaction between private parties did not qualify for “safe harbor” protection under Bankruptcy Code section 546(e), on the basis that a “financial institution” acted as an intermediary in the overarching transaction.

Leveraged transactions, such as leveraged buyouts (LBO) and leveraged recapitalizations, carry the risk of being unwound in a later bankruptcy of the party that transferred assets (including granting liens) or incurred obligations in the transaction. The risk that such transactions may be upset in bankruptcy extends, of course, to selling shareholders in an LBO and to shareholders who receive purchase price funds or dividends in a leveraged recap.

Fraudulent conveyance litigation arising from failed leveraged buyout transactions is frequently pursued in bankruptcy proceedings as the sole source of recovery for creditors. Targets of these actions typically include those parties who received the proceeds generated by the LBO, including the debtor’s former shareholders.

Phil Anker, in this article published by DailyDAC's Commercial Bankruptcy Alternatives, explores the “Absolute Priority Rule” and other “Rules” of “Priority” in bankruptcy, and if they really are “absolute,” if they really are “rules,” and if they always provide “priority” to some claimants over others.

HIGHLIGHTS:

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __ (2017), holding that a bankruptcy court may not use a structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case to approve a distribution scheme that violates the absolute priority rule. In many middle-market cases, chapter 11 debtors had used this tool to get deals done and reorganize, despite their inability to confirm a chapter 11 plan.

A potential threat to the Code’s priority scheme is the allowance of “structured dismissals,” which include a settlement as part of the dismissal of the chapter 11 case that would distribute estate assets in a manner that contravenes the Code’s priority rules.

A recent decision from the Southern District of New York may reopen a door — which many had believed was all but closed — for disgruntled creditors seeking to challenge failed leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”) as fraudulent conveyances. In In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 2016 WL 4030937 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2016), District Judge Denise Cote reinstated an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim seeking to claw back $6.3 billion in distributions made to Lyondell Chemical’s shareholders through an LBO that failed quickly and dramatically.

The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.