TheLehman Brothers bankruptcy court has determined that the contractually specified methodology for conducting the liquidation of a swap agreement is protected by the safe harbor provisions of the bankruptcy, even if the selected methodology would be more favorable to the non-defaulting counterparty than the liquidation methodology that would apply absent the bankruptcy.See Michigan State Housing Dev. Auth. v. Lehman Bros. Deriv. Prods. Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, ---B.R.
Over the past two weeks, the federal government has relied on nearly every legal authority available to address the unfolding crisis in financial institutions with large mortgage-related holdings — direct and indirect financial assistance, government takeovers and even a decision to let the bankruptcy process run its course have all come into play. Today, several new actions have been announced, together with proposals that would require Congressional action.
On June 25, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) issued a memorandum decision in the Lehman Brothers SIPA proceeding1 holding that claims asserted by certain repurchase agreement (“repo”) counterparties (the “Representative Claimants”) did not qualify for treatment as customer claims under SIPA.
In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).
The Second Circuit ruled last week in Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, No. 18-1079 (2d Cir. 2020) that a Lehman Brothers affiliate cannot claw back $1 billion in payments made pursuant to swap agreements that were terminated when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and certain of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in 2008. The panel concluded that the Bankruptcy Code provides a safe harbor for the liquidation of such swap agreements and also the distribution of proceeds from the collateral.
On 24 October 2017 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in what has become known as the Waterfall IIA and B litigation (Burlington Loan Management Limited and others v Lomas and others [2017] EWCA Civ 1462). The decision also covered an appeal of one point from the High Court Waterfall IIC decision.
On 29 February 2012, the Supreme Court handed down its decision In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986. The appeal addressed the meaning and application of Chapter 7 of the Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS 7) issued by the FSA for the safeguarding and distributing of client money in implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC.
Background
In light of the recent Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and the subsequent determination of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to commence a proceeding placing Lehman Brothers Inc.
The Supreme Court recently considered the scope of the anti-deprivation principle, in Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited (respondent) v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (appellant) [2011] UKSC 38 (Belmont). Understanding the scope of this principle is important for anyone entering a contract where the parties’ rights and obligations change if one of them enters an insolvency procedure. Robert Spedding explains how the courts applied the principle in Belmont and makes some practical suggestions for avoiding problems.
The Determinations Panel gave its reasons for imposing financial support directions (FSDs) on six Lehman Brothers companies on 29 September 2009. SNR Denton represented 22 of the 44 companies targeted for FSDs. The Determinations Panel accepted our submission that it would not be reasonable to impose an FSD on any of the companies we represented because of the Pensions Regulator's failure to particularise its case against them.
Background