On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).

During the past 18 months, the world has felt the impact of derivatives on financial markets. Many businesses have for years used derivative contracts such as currency or interest rate swaps or forward contracts for the purchase of oil, gold, natural gas, wheat or other commodities to hedge their exposure to an unexpected rise or fall in values, interest rates or prices. However, the scope and extent of trading in derivative instruments exploded during the past 10 years, causing profound effects on the world’s financial markets.

In a matter of first impression arising in the largest corporate bankruptcy in history, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York invalidated a common contractual provision shifting payment priority upon the default of a swap counterparty (“Flip Clause”) in a credit-linked debt structure.1

In a significant ruling with potentially wide-reaching implications, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the Securities Act of 1933 causes of action (Sections 11, 12, and 15) against McGraw Hill and Moody's (the "Rating Agencies") in In re: Lehman Brother Mortgage Backed Securities Litigation.

On January 25, Judge Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) in a case examining a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction and concerning the effect of event of default provisions on the payment priorities of LBSF as swap counterparty under certain swap agreements and the holders of certain credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes. The payment waterfalls (Priority Provisions) of most CDO transactions give priority to swap counterparties over noteholders.

Court Broadens Interpretation of Code Sections Invalidating Ipso Facto Contract Provisions

In a recent Hunton & Williams client alert, we discussed some of the issues relating to the termination of credit default swap agreements that were pending before the Lehman bankruptcy court, including the enforceability of so-called “flip clauses.” (“Swap Termination and the Subordination of Termination Payments in the Lehman Bankruptcy,” December 2009.) Recently, the court ruled for Lehman on many of these issues. The court’s ruling (Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.

In a majority opinion dated December 15, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a chapter 11 debtor may not equitably subordinate a creditor's claim and transfer the lien securing that claim, when such creditor is, itself, in bankruptcy, before first obtaining relief from the automatic stay under section 362 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in such creditor's bankruptcy case. Lehman Commercial Paper v. Palmdale Hills Prop. (In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4294 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2009).

A recent decision in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) in the Lehman case has extended the unenforceability of ipso facto clauses to a provision triggered by the bankruptcy filing of an affiliate of a contractual party.

On March 15, 2010 Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) with the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases (the “Court”) seeking authorization to establish certain claims and alternative dispute resolution procedures designed to expedite the process of reconciling claims filed against the Debtors’ estates.

The procedures, set forth in detail in an exhibit to the proposed order filed with the Motion, are summarized as follows: