In 1984, the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to examine the Bankruptcy Code’s new definition of “claim” in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Focusing on the “right to payment” language in that definition, the court decided that a claim arises when a claimant’s right to payment accrues under applicable nonbankruptcy law. This “accrual” test was widely criticized by other circuit courts as contradicting the broad definition of “claim” envisioned by Congress and the Bankruptcy Code.

Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.

Changes made to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 raised the bar considerably for providing “pay to stay” incentives that had been offered routinely to management and other key employees of a chapter 11 debtor, such as a severance or key employee retention plan (“KERP”).

Summary

On 26 July 2012, the Pensions Regulator (the 'Regulator') issued a statement on financial support directions (FSDs) with the intention of providing further guidance and comfort with regard to the circumstances in which it will issue an FSD after a company has been placed into administration.

Participants in the multibillion-dollar market for distressed claims and securities have had ample reason to keep a watchful eye on developments in the bankruptcy courts during the last decade. That vigil appeared to have been over five years ago, after a federal district court ruled in the Enron chapter 11 cases that sold claims are generally not subject to equitable subordination or disallowance on the basis of the seller's misconduct or receipt of a voidable transfer. A ruling recently handed down by a Delaware bankruptcy court, however, has reignited the debate.

As the seventh anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code draws near, the volume of chapter 15 cases commenced in U.S. bankruptcy courts on behalf of foreign debtors has increased rapidly. During that period, there has also (understandably) been a marked uptick in litigation concerning various aspects of the comparatively new legislative regime governing cross-border bankruptcy cases patterned on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. One such issue was the subject of a ruling recently handed down by a Texas district court. In In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 470 B.R.

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.

On May 14, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first ruling of this Term concerning a bankruptcy issue. In Hall v. U.S., S. Ct.

In keeping with the courts’ narrow construction of what constitutes “substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case, an Ohio bankruptcy court in In re AmFin Financial Corp., 2012 WL 652018 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012), denied administrative- expense priority to the fees and expenses of the holders of approximately $100 million in senior notes (the “Senior Noteholders”) issued by debtor AmFin Financial Corporation (“AFC”).

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.