Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) is required to satisfy postpetition obligations under any unexpired lease of commercial property pending a decision to assume or reject the lease. Specifically, section 365(d)(3) requires the trustee, with limited exceptions, to “timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from and after the order for relief” under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee.

In a much-awaited judgment, the UK Supreme Court has decided that the liability of a company in administration or liquidation to contribute to an under-funded pension fund following a Financial Support Direction or a Contribution Notice is a provable debt ranking equally with other unsecured creditors. Crucially, it is not an expense of the administration or liquidation which would cause it to rank ahead of all creditors (except fixed charge holders) and even the administrator's or liquidator's own remuneration.

Europe, the U.S. and Canada—On 7 May 2013, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware denied a motion by European creditors of Nortel Networks Corp. ("Nortel") to certify a direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit of the bankruptcy court's 3 April 2013 ruling (Inre Nortel Networks, Inc., Case No. 09-10138 (KG), 2013 BL 92666 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr.

Chapter 11 debtors and sophisticated creditor and/or shareholder constituencies are increasingly using postpetition plan support agreements (sometimes referred to as “lockup” agreements) to set forth prenegotiated terms of a chapter 11 plan prior to the filing of a disclosure statement and a plan with the bankruptcy court. Under such lockup agreements, if the debtor ultimately proposes a chapter 11 plan that includes prenegotiated terms, signatories are typically obligated to vote in favor of the plan.

Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code caps the amount of a lessor’s claim against a debtor-lessee for damages arising from the termination of a real property lease. The statutory cap is calculated according to a formula that considers, among other things, the date on which the lessor “repossessed” or the debtor-lessee “surrendered” the leased property. Because those terms are not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, however, courts disagree as to whether state or federal law should determine their meanings for the purpose of calculating the allowed amount of the lessor’s claims.

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of a cramdown (nonconsensual) chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

One of the hallmarks of the U.S. bankruptcy system is ready access to information concerning any entity that files for bankruptcy protection. The integrity of that system is premised upon the presumption that not only creditors and other interested parties in a bankruptcy case, but also the public at large, should have the ability to examine any document filed with the bankruptcy court.

October 17, 2013, will mark the eighth anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as part of the comprehensive U.S. bankruptcy-law reforms implemented in 2005. Chapter 15, which governs cross-border bankruptcy and insolvency cases, is patterned after the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Model Law”), a framework of legal principles formulated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) in 1997 to deal with the rapidly expanding volume of international insolvency cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first bankruptcy decision of 2013 on May 13. In a unanimous ruling, the court held in Bullock v. BankChampaign N.A., 2013 BL 125909 (U.S. May 13, 2013), that the term “defalcation” for purposes of denying discharge of a debt under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code includes a “culpable state of mind” requirement involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness with respect to, the improper nature of a fiduciary’s behavior.

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).