In U.S. Capital Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 2018 WL 1143822, No. 15-1509 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an appellate court should apply a deferential standard of review to a bankruptcy court’s decision as to whether a creditor is a "nonstatutory" insider of the debtor for the purpose of determining whether the creditor’s vote in favor of a nonconsensual chapter 11 plan can be counted.

In Momentive Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF, NA (In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C.), 2017 BL 376794 (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 2017) ("Momentive"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a long-anticipated decision, affirmed a number of lower court rulings on hot-button bankruptcy issues, including allowance (or, in this case, denial) of a claim for a "make-whole" premium and contractual subordination of junior notes.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equityholders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in attempting to implement its underlying policy objectives. In In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 2017 WL 1718438 (2d Cir.

On February 1, 2017, the Supreme Court of Singapore and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware announced that they had formally implemented Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (the "Guidelines"). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York adopted the Guidelines on February 17, 2017.

On February 8, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the class action lawsuit brought by unsecured bondholders of Chesapeake Energy Corporation ("Chesapeake"), adopting the so-called narrow reading of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 ("TIA").[1]

In Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Beneficial Owners (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.), 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the “safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code for settlement payments and for payments made in connection with securities contracts preempted claims under state law by creditors to avoid as fraudulent transfers pre-bankruptcy payments made to shareholders in connection with a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) of the debtor.

Even before Congress added section 365(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it was generally understood that a nonresidential real property lease which has been validly terminated under applicable law prior to a bankruptcy filing by the debtor-former tenant cannot be assumed or assigned in bankruptcy. Moreover, the terminated leasehold interest is excluded from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and any action by the landlord to obtain possession of the formerly leased premises is not prohibited by the automatic stay.

Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from the trustee’s power to avoid preferential transfers any transaction in which the debtor transfers property to a creditor in the “ordinary course of business.” Exactly what constitutes “ordinary course of business,” however, is not a settled question of law. In Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 798 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether a first-time transaction between a debtor and a creditor can satisfy the ordinary course exception.

Italian Insolvency Law Reforms

Trademark licensees that file for bankruptcy protection face uncertainty concerning their ability to continue using trademarks that are crucial to their businesses. Some of this stems from an unsettled issue in the courts as to whether a licensee can assume a trademark license without the licensor’s consent. In In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 2015 BL 44152 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015), a Delaware bankruptcy court reaffirmed that the ongoing controversy surrounding the “actual” versus “hypothetical” test for assumption of a trademark license has not abated.