A purchaser of a business who fails to consider the seller's Georgia sales and use tax obligations does so at the purchaser's own peril. In the recent tax case of JD Design Group, Inc. v. Graham, the ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court makes that point all too clear.

Background

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently awarded an oversecured lender post-petition interest on the full amount of its secured claim at the default rate set forth in the lender’s contract (19%) plus compound (PIK) interest up to the aggregate rate of 25% (the maximum rate allowable under New York State usury laws). In re Urban Communicators PCS Limited Partnership, et al., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4062 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 12/11/07) (Gerber, B.J.).

The Bankruptcy Code facilitates asset sales in chapter 11 by offering incentives to buyers and flexibility in structuring and timing the sale. A buyer can acquire assets free and clear of liens and is permitted to "cherry-pick" the debtor's contracts and leases to select only those it wants to keep. The assets and sale process can be structured in many ways, including auctions, private sales, lot or bulk sales, and going concern transactions.

The Key Parties

Late last year, government responses to the subprime mortgage crisis proliferated but most attention focused on those measures that could be, and in some cases were, rapidly implemented — measures like the Treasury Department’s urging holders of certain subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to freeze interest rates temporarily or the Federal Reserve’s proposed tightening of lending requirements.

A New York bankruptcy court has determined that original issue discount (OID) on a note is effectively interest—and therefore even though the OID at issue was secured, the amount that accrued after acceleration is not recoverable. The decision has been appealed.

Creditors have recently made some headway in collecting the full amount to which they are contractually entitled pursuant to various debt instruments. In In re Calpine Corp.,1 reported in our summer 2007 newsletter, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York permitted a secured creditor to collect damages (albeit in the form of an unsecured claim) caused by dashed expectations due to the early repayment of its debt.

In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “U.S. Court”) exercised its abstention powers and dismissed an involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against an Argentine company, Compania de Alimentos Fargo, SA (“Fargo”).1 Fargo, a debtor in an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, had moved to dismiss the involuntary petition principally because its Argentine bankruptcy case was still pending.

In UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli),1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor is entitled to collect a prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor. The Court found that the secured creditor could collect the penalty, whether or not it is reasonable, so long as the penalty is enforceable under state law. The Court reasoned that any other holding would leave open the possibility that an unsecured creditor could recover more from a solvent estate than a secured creditor.

Background

The next time you negotiate a settlement payment with a financially troubled party, you may want to keep in mind an ancient term related to livestock herding: earmarking. The concept may be somewhat antiquated, but the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that it is still viable – and can help you keep the settlement payment if the other party later files for bankruptcy.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.