On April 1st, the FDIC closed on a sale of an equity interest in a limited liability company (LLC) created to hold certain assets transferred from 19 failed bank receiverships. The purchaser of the interest in the Multibank Structured Transaction Single Family Residential 2010-1 is Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation. The sale was conducted through a competitive auction held on February 24, 2010. Nine different qualified groups submitted bids to purchase either a 50% leveraged ownership interest or a 20% unleveraged ownership interest in the newly formed LLC.
The recent case of Mervyn’s LLC v Lubert-Adler Group IV, LLC, et al. (In re Mervyn’s Holdings, LLC),1 serves as a warning to sellers and equity firms participating in leveraged buyouts to be wary of the effect such buyouts will have on creditors of the target company.
Overview
On April 1, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) closed the sale of an equity interest in a limited liability company (LLC) created to hold certain assets transferred from 19 failed bank receiverships. The purchaser of the interest in the Multibank Structured Transaction Single Family Residential 2010-1 is Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation (Roundpoint). The sale was the result of a competitive auction held on February 24.
Debt for Equity Exchanges Outside Bankruptcy
Introduction
Several recent bankruptcy decisions rendered in the Third Circuit address whether the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to informal or “ad hoc” committees.1 Although these courts base their reasoning on the “plain meaning” of Rule 2019, their ultimate holdings are inconsistent and have generated renewed interest in this topic among lenders and the investing community. This article provides a brief summary of these recent decisions and examines their inconsistencies.
A creditor’s ability to vote on a plan of reorganization is one of its most fundamental rights in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. For strategic investors in distressed debt, the power to vote—and potentially control a voting class (or obtain a blocking position in that class)— can be a critical tool in maximizing value and return on investment. Investors should be aware, however, that a recent decision by Judge Robert E.
Introduction
What should be the remedy when a bankruptcy court holds that a security interest is avoidable as a preferential transfer, but the value of the security interest is not readily ascertainable? The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in USAA Federal Savings Bank v. Thacker (In re: Taylors), 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5793 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court held that, since the value of the security interest was not readily ascertainable, the only available remedy is for the bankruptcy court to return the security interest itself, not its value, to the bankruptcy estate.
In 1999 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its decision in Calpine Corp. v. O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. (In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc.), 181 F.2d 527, denying Calpine Corporation’s request for the payment of a break-up fee after Calpine lost its effort to acquire the assets of O’Brien Environmental Energy out of bankruptcy.