This article analyses the extent to which dissenting financial creditors are protected under the Indian insolvency regime.
BACKGROUND
Since its inception the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) has been an evolving legislation with regular updation(s) being brought about in the form of rules and regulations with a view of streamlining the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP).
Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (“BLRC”) was very clear while setting out the objectives of the new insolvency law for the country and speedy resolution/decision making in an insolvency situation was stated to be one of such foremost objectives. Fragmented laws governing an insolvency and lack of a cohesive framework governing the rights of various stakeholders during insolvency was identified as a primary reason for inefficiency of the pre-existing legal framework.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("the Code" & “IBC”) has been widely acclaimed as a transformative legislative framework in India, representing a significant departure from previous insolvency laws by emphasizing efficient resolution processes and the professionalization of insolvency services.
In the case of Iskon Infra Engineering Private Limited v.
Since the inception of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code“), the debt resolution regime in India has witnessed not only a paradigm shift from the conventional ‘debtor in possession’ to a progressive ‘creditor in control’ but has also undergone a significant transformation, marking a departure from its traditional labyrinthine processes to a more streamlined and effective framework.
Introduction
For initiating proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC”), categorisation of a creditor as either a “financial creditor” or an “operational creditor” is a rather significant first step. Such categorisation is not merely organisational, but essential since the rights, obligations and procedural requirements for realisation of debt by financial and operational creditors also differ under the IBC.
1. Introduction
The longstanding debate surrounding the prioritization of crown debts vis-à-vis private debts has entered a new chapter with the advent of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”). Prior to the IBC, the common law principle generally granted crown debts preferential status over unsecured debts. This historical primacy stemmed from the sovereign's role as the embodiment of the public good, requiring unimpeded revenue collection for the smooth functioning of the State.
The Bombay High Court recently quashed a provision of a central government office memorandum that enabled public sector banks to request issuance of look out circulars (LoCs) against wilful defaulters. In Viraj Chetan Shah v Union of India, the court held that this provision violated the fundamental right to life (Article 21) as well as the fundamental right to equality (Article 14). The government is reportedly contemplating a statutory basis for PSBs to initiate LoCs.